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SUMMARY
The thesis is a conceptual analysis of the concept of tacit knowledge. The analysis consist of
comparing the function of the concept of tacit knowledge in a number of selected theories from
its origin in the philosophy of Michael Polanyi, through its introduction to organisation theory
and its eventual application in knowledge management theory.
In the work of Michael Polanyi the concept of tacit knowledge functions as the logical structure
underlying all forms of knowledge. In terms of Polanyi tacit and explicit knowledge are not
two separable phenomena, because all knowledge is rooted in the act of tacit integration.
Ikujiro Nonaka adapted Polanyi's epistemology and within his framework the concept of tacit
knowledge signifies the unstructured subjective realm that is the wellspring of individual
creativity. Nonaka asserts firstly, that the phenomenon of tacit knowledge is a knowledge
content that is distinct from explicit knowledge content and secondly, that it is possible to
convert the one type of knowledge into the other. Nonaka's model includes a spiral process of
interaction in which tacit knowledge is converted into explicit knowledge and back into tacit
knowledge again.
The last chapter relates the conclusions reached upon the comparison of the function of the
concept in the theories of Nonaka and Polanyi, with its reception in knowledge management
theory. It is argued that in knowledge management the concept of tacit knowledge denotes
knowledge content that cannot be communicated as information. It is also shown how
Nonaka' s model was integrated into a sender receiver model of communication, thus
incorporating it into the information processing paradigm. It is furthermore conjectured that
the concept of tacit knowledge forms part of an attempt to bridge an epistemological gap
facing the discourse on organisational knowledge. Lastly, it is concluded that it appears to be
impossible to use the concept of tacit knowledge to overcome this epistemological problem,
without an ontological shift away from the information processing paradigm.
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OPSOMMING
Die tesis is 'n konseptuele analise van die konsep van implisiete ('tacit') kennis. Die analise
bestaan uit 'n vergelyking van die funksie van die konsep van implisiete kennis in 'n aantal
geselekteerde teorieë, van die oorsprong van die term in die filosofie van Michael Polanyi,
deur die aanpassing van die konsep in organisasie teorie, tot die toepassing daarvan in
kennisbestuursteorie.
Indie werk van Polanyi funksioneer die konsep as die logiese struktuur wat die onderbou van
alle vorme van kennis is. In terme van Polanyi is implisiete en eksplisiete kennis nie twee
aparte fenomene nie, want alle kennis is gewortel in die askie van implisiete integrasie.
Ikujiro Nonaka het Polanyi se epistemologie aangepas en binne sy raamwerk funksioneer die
begrip as 'n beskrywing van die ongestruktureerde subjektiewe domein wat die bron van
individuele kreatiwiteit is. Volgens Nonaka is die fenomeen van implisiete kennis eerstens 'n
kennisinhoud wat onderskeibaar is van eksplisiete kennisinhoud, en tweedens dat dit
moontlik is om die een soort kennis om te skakel in die ander en omgekeerd. Nonaka se model
sluit 'n spiral-proses van interaksie in waarin implisiete kennis omgeskakel word na eksplisiete
kennis en weer terug in implisiete kennis.
Die laaste hoofstuk belig die ontvangs van die konsep van implisiete kennis in
kennisbestuursteorie teen die agtergrond van die vergelyking van die funksionering van die
konsep in die teorieë van Polanyi en Nonaka. Daar word geargumenteer dat in
kennisbestuursteorie die konsep verwys na kennisinhoud wat nie geredelik omgeskakel kan
word na informasie en dus gekommunikeer kan word nie. Daar word getoon hoe Nonaka se
model met 'n sender-ontvanger kommunikasie-model geïntegreer word en dus geïnkorporeer
word in die informasie prossesseringsparadigrna. Verder word gespekuleer dat die konsep
gebruik word in 'n poging om 'n epistemologiese gaping in die diskoers rondom
organisatoriese kennis te oorbrug. Laastens is die slotsom dat dit blyk onmoontlik te wees om
die konsep van implisiete kennis te gebruik om die epistemologiese probleem op te los, sonder
'n fundamentele ontologiese skuif weg vanaf die informasie prossesseringsparadigma.
iv
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CONTENTS
CHAPTER ONE
THE CONCEPT OF TACIT KNOWLEDGE 1
1.1 IN1RODUCTION 1
1.2 OVERVIEW 3
1.3 CRITIQUE OR ORTHODOXY? 6
1.4 Focus AND DELIMITATION 8
1.5 S1RUCTURE, WELLSPRING, AND CONTENT 10
CHAPTER Two
MICHAEL POLANYI:
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE AND TACIT KNOWLEDGE ..•••.....••....•••........... 12
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.5.1
2.5.2
2.6
2.6.1
2.6.2
2.6.3
2.7
2.8
2.9
IN1RODUCTION 12
ApPROACHING POLANYI 15
POLANYI'S STARTING POINT 18
PERCEPTION - THE FUNCTIONAL ASPECT OF TACIT KNOWING 20
ACTION - THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL ASPECT OF TACIT KNOWING 23
Two kinds of meaning 26
Indwelling as the interiorisation of particulars 28
MEANING - THE SEMANTIC ASPECT OF TACIT KNOWING 29
Two kinds of awareness and directedness (intentionality) 29
Meaning as the direction of the vector of integration 32
Implications of Tacit knowing as the Structure ofKnowing 33
KNOWLEDGE, LANGUAGE AND THE PARADIGM OF INDWELLING 35
SUMMARY: THE ESSENCEOF THE ARGUMENT CONCERNING TACIT
INTEGRATION 41
POLANYI'S CRITIQUE OF OBJECTIVISMIN PHILOSOPHY 42
v
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER THREE
IKUJIRO NONAKA:
KNOWLEDGE CREATION AND KNOWLEDGE PROCESSING 46
1.1 INTRODUCTION 46
1.2 NELSON AND WINTER:
TACIT KNOWLEDGE AND ORGANISATIONAL ROUTINES .48
1.2.1
1.2.2
1.3
1.4
1.4.1
1.4.2
1.4.3
1.4.4
1.4.5
1.5
1.5.1
1.5.2
1.5.3
1.5.4
1.5.5
1.6
1.7
1.7.1
1.7.2
Resource-based and evolutionary theories of the ftrm 50
Dynamic Capabilities 53
ApPROACHING NONAKA 56
SECI MODEL OF KNOWLEDGE CONVERSION AND THE KNOWLEDGE SPIRAL 61
Socialisation 62
Externalisation 63
Combination 63
Internalisation 64
The Knowledge Spiral 65
FIVE PHASES OF ORGANISATIONAL KNOWLEDGE CREATION 66
Sharing Tacit Knowledge 66
Creating Concepts 67
Justifying Concepts : 67
Building an Archetype 69
Cross-levelling Knowledge 69
THE CONCEPT OF "BA" 70
COMPARING NONAKA WITH POLANYI 72
Enabling tacit germination vs mobilising tacit content 74
Conclusion 77
CHAPTER FOUR
THE RECEPTION OF TACIT KNOWLEDGE IN
KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT THEORY ...............................•................. 79
1.1 INTRODUCTION 79
1.2 KNOWLEDGE AS 'NOT- INFORMATION' 80
1.3 A COMMUNICATION MODEL FOR TACIT KNOWLEDGE 86
1.4 BRIDGING THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL GAP 89
1.5 ONTOLOGY IN REVIEW 94
BIBLIOGRAPHY 98
vi
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Chapter One
TH E CONCEPT OF
TACIT KNOWLEDGE
Words, as is well known, are the great foes of reality.
Joseph Conrad, "Under Western Eyes."
1.1 INTRODUCTION
This thesis aims to provide an interpretative overview of the notion of tacit
knowledge from its origin in philosophy to its current application in management
studies in general and in knowledge management theory in particular. Inorder to do
this the function of the concept of tacit knowledge is traced from its origin and its role
in Michael Polanyi's philosophy:' to the introduction of the concept to economic and
organisation theory through Nelson and Winter's An evolutionary theory of economic
change.: and its adaptation to knowledge management theory primarily by way of the
influence of Nonaka and Takeuchi's The knowledge-creating companu»
The concept of tacit knowledge has assumed a prominent role in the discourse on
organisational knowledge, particularly in what arose in the nineties under the label
Polanyi, M. 1958.Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy. Chicago IL:
University of Chicago Press
2 Nelson, RR and SGWinter. 1982.An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Cambridge
MA: Harvard University Press
Nonaka, I and H Takeuchi. 1995. The Knowledge-Creating Company: How Japanese Companies
Manage the Dynamics of Innovation. Oxford: Oxford University Press
1
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of 'knowledge management.' 4 This field of inquiry assumes that knowledge is a
source of competitive advantage for organisations. As a management practice it aims
at the development (creation or acquisition) and diffusion of relevant knowledge to
the appropriate areas of the organisation,"
As a relatively new field of study, knowledge management theory initially focussed
little attention on its own conception of (organisational) knowledge. Knowledge
management theory only became established after Nonaka provided an
epistemology that seemed appropriate for conceptualising the types of knowledge
that are organisational resources or sources of competitive advantage. This
epistemology relies on a distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge and it soon
became clear that this distinction was not used consistently. There exists a secondary
discourse within knowledge management theory that is critical of the way in which
the concept of tacit knowledge is employed. Most of this secondary discourse
highlights the disparities or differences between Polanyi's original conceptualisation
and its application in knowledge management theory,"
4 Stacey, RD. 2001. Complex Responsive Processes in Organization: Learning and Knowledge
Creation. London: Routledge; Tsoukas, H. 1996. The Firm as a Distributed Knowledge
System: A Constructionist Approach, Strategic Management Journal17/ Winter Special Issue:
3.
5 These practices could, and frequently do, encompass almost every organisational activity
from strategy to quality control. The distinction between knowledge development
(concerned with the sources of new knowledge) and knowledge diffusion (concerned with
the logistics of existing knowledge) is an inherent tension in knowledge management
theory that will be explored.
6 Brohm, R. Bringing Polanyi onto the Theatre Stage: A Study on Polanyi Applied to
Knowledge Management, paper presented at the Seventh International Symposium on the
Management of Corporate and Industrial Knowledge, Rotterdam, Netherlands 1997;Johnson, B,
E Lorenz, and B-A Lundvall. 2002.Why All This Fuss About Codified and Tacit
Knowledge?, Industrial and Corporate Change 11/2; Leonard, D and S Sensiper. 1998. The
Role of Tacit Knowledge in Group Innovation, California Management Review 40/ 3;
Schreinemakers, JF and JEssers. 1997. Nonaka's Subjectivist Conception of Knowledge in
Corporate Knowledge Management, Knowledge Organization 24/ 1;Snowden, D. 2002.
Complex Acts of Knowing:Paradox and Descriptive Self-Awareness, Journal of Knowledge
Management 6/ 2; Spender, Jc. 1996. Competitive Advantage from Tacit Knowledge?
Unpacking the Concept and Its Strategic Implications, in Moingeon, B and A Edmondson
(eds.), Organisational Learning and Competitive Advantage. London: Sage; Stacey. Complex
Responsive Processes in Organization; Tsoukas, H. 2002. Do We Really Understand Tacit
Knowledge? Presented to Knowledge Economy and Society Seminar, LSEDepartment of
Information Systems, 14 June 2002;Whitley, EA. 2000. Tacit and Explicit Knowledge:
Conceptual Confusion around the Commodification of Knowledge. In Department of
Information Systems, LSE: Working Paper Series. London; Whitley, EA and T Hedesstrom.
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This problem of variation and even contradiction in the use of the concept of tacit
knowledge is not limited to knowledge management theory. The concept of tacit
knowledge is very popular in spite of (or maybe because of?) it's nebulous meaning.
It has been used in many different disciplines and to many different ends. The
following section provides an overview of the wide application of the concept of tacit
knowledge and is evidence of the considerable variation in its function.
1.2 OVERVIEW
Polanyi introduced the concept of tacit knowledge into academic discourse in his
arguments relating to the nature of perception. From these origins in philosophy of
mind, he applied the concept in the area of philosophy of science; using the concept
of tacit knowledge to show that there is a common structure to all kinds of
knowledge, thus undermining some of the commonly held assumptions regarding
the difference between theoretical and practical knowledge.
As conceptualised by Polanyi the phenomenon of tacit knowledge involves a
merging of skills and presuppositions into a complex whole that cannot be taken
apart in analysis. This conflation of presuppositions and cognitive skills lies at the
basis of the eventual varied applications of the concept. This introductory section will
demonstrate that the concept of tacit knowledge operates in a range of, sometimes
contradictory, functions in many different theories.
The concept of tacit knowledge continues to exert an influence on themes that derive
from the philosophy of mind, for instance in the study of artificial intelligence.
Thinkers who were sceptical of the artificial intelligence programme used the concept
of tacit knowledge to refer to those elements of human intelligence that supposedly
cannot be represented as algorithms?
2000. What Is Meant by Tacit Knowledge? Towards a Better Understanding of the Shape of
Actions. In Department of Information Systems, LSE: Working Paper Series. London
7 Hofstader, D. 1979. Gëdel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid. New York NY: Basic Books
3
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Sociologists who are primarily interested in the sociology of science and technology
were quick to make use of Polanyi's contribution to the philosophy of science. This
group of social researchers called their method the "social studies of science."B A
prominent exponent of this approach is probably Harry Collins? whose study of
scientists at work highlighted the fact that many of the conventions used by scientists
during their experiments are never formalised or codified and are therefore instances
of tacit knowledge." Similarly MacKenzie looks to the concept of tacit knowledge to
explain why the Soviet nuclear weapons programme, which used large amounts of
stolen specification and data obtained by spies, actually took longer than the
American effort."
In essence this' cognitive approach' to sociology of science is a critique of the more
traditional sociological approaches that try to explain advances in science and
technology in terms of structural factors such as institutional settings, subsidy
structures, financial resources and the like. Instead, the social studies of science
writers focus on the sociological forces that influence the cognitive aspects of
scientific work. The central point made by these scholars is that scientific skills are
not transmitted through the medium of written words or formulae, but rather
through the medium of socialised apprenticeships." The concept of tacit knowledge
8 Also referred to as the Sociology of Science and Technology or the Sociology of Science Studies.
For an overview of such approaches to science, one can turn to Fuller, S et al. (eds.), 1989.
The Cognitive Turn: Sociological and Psychological Perspectives on Science. Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic
9 Collins, HM. 1990.Artificial Experts: Social Knowledge and Intelligent Machines. Cambridge
MA: MIT; Collins, HM. 1993.The Structure of Knowledge, Social Research 60/ 1.
10 One of Collins' studies was on the development of a new laser. Scientists working on this
project never explicitly defined the exact length of the "short" leads between the capacitors
and the electrodes in the laser, and as a result some laboratories failed to build operational
lasers. Collins argued that knowledge such as what "short" means in a laboratory, is
learned socially and becomes a tacit skill in a scientist's makeup.
11 MacKenzie, D and G Spinardi. 1995. Tacit Knowledge, Weapons Design and the
Uninvention of Nuclear Weapons, American Journal of Sociology 101/ 1.
12 This insight has major implications for government policies regarding science and
technology spending, because it suggests that regional innovative capacity is linked to a
social milieu of innovation. For examples of this kind of argument see the following two
papers: Lawson, C and E Lorenz. 1999. Collective Learning, Tacit Knowledge and Regional
Innovative Capacity, Regional Studies 33/4; Nightingale, P. 1998.A Cognitive Model of
Innovation, Research Policy 27.
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is used by these writers to link cognition with socialisation, thus grounding some
cognitive elements in the socialised skill set of scientists.
Polanyi modelled his idea of the common (tacit) structure underlying all forms of
knowledge on the structure of perception as depicted in Gestalt psychology. It is thus
no surprise that the concept of tacit knowledge found an eager reception in some
quarters of psychology; in particular experimental psychology and pedagogy
(learning/teaching psychology). Naturally, if it is possible to know more than one can
tell, the question is to what extent we learn without being aware of what we learn.
Rebert" calls this "implicit learning" and argues that in certain cases new knowledge
can be acquired without conscious effort or even intent.
The inability to express in words precisely what is meant, confronted researchers at
the Harvard Lab for Computer and Spatial Analysis during the development of
Geographic Information Systems. They found that the problem of modelling' surfaces'
involved more than the technical problem of processing and displaying geographical
data. They came to the conclusion that those involved in teasing out the meanings of
the term 'surfaces' developed tacit knowledge (shared understandings) that
facilitated the development process.
The term, 'surface,' came to take on new and sometimes abstract
meanings. The language used to describe' surfaces' was rooted in tacit
knowledge and more formal mathematics. The mixing of different
forms of language, both verbal and written, allowed the passing of
abstract and sometimes difficult meanings."
The concept of tacit knowing also found application in health care and diagnosis
theory, since tacit knowing relies on the integration of particulars into a whole, as in
13 See for instance: Reber, AS. 1989. Implicit Learning and Tacit Knowledge, Journal of
Experimental Psychology 118;Reber, AS. 1993. Implicit Learning and Tacit Knowledge: An Essay
on the Cognitive Unconscious. Oxford: Oxford University Press
14 McHaffie, P. 2000. Surfaces: Tacit Knowledge, Formal Language, and Metaphor at the
Harvard Lab for Computer Graphics and Spatial Analysis, International Journal of
Geographical Information Science 14/8: 755.
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the case of diagnosing a medical condition." One paper on the subject regards the
way inwhich nurses rely on tacit knowledge that enable them to make more accurate
assessments of the condition of specific patients under their care."
It is therefore clear that the concept of tacit knowledge has found a wide and eager
reception in many theories across various disciplines. What is problematic is the fact
that the concept of tacit knowledge is used in a variety of different ways, resulting in
a lack of conceptual clarity.
1.3 CRITIQUEOR ORTHODOXY?
There is however a unifying factor. It is striking that inmost of the disciplines where
the concept of tacit knowledge took root, the concept seem to operate as the basis for
a critique of established theory. As a result it remains a marginal or peripheral
concept inmost of the fields of study where it has been employed. This is even true
of the 'post-critical philosophy' of its originator. Polanyi's philosophical project is in
essence a critique of the (then) dominant view of 'objectivism' in philosophy of
science." In a similar way social studies of science writers use the concept of tacit
knowledge as the basis for a critique of an institutional approach to sociology of
science," evolutionary economists use it as the basis for a critique of neo-classical
economics.t? artificial intelligence sceptics use it as the basis for a critique of an
algorithmic worldview, and the dynamic capabilities approach use the concept as a
15 Polanyi was a medical practitioner himself and he used the example of medical diagnosis
to explain the phenomenon of tacit knowledge. See, Polanyi. Personal Knowledge: 88-89.
16 Clinton, M. 1998. On Reflection in Action: Unaddressed Issues in Refocussing the Debate
on Reflective Practice, International Journal of Nursing Practice 4/ 3.
17 Grene, M (ed.), 1969a. Knowing and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi. London: Routledge: ix-
xvii.
18 See, Fuller et al. (eds.). The Cognitive Tum
19 Nelson and Winter. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change: 73.
6
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the basis for critique of the dominant view of the firm as a knowledge processing
system, rather than a knowledge creating system.ë'
However, the work of Ikujiro Nonaka marks a turning point in the theoretical history
of the concept of tacit knowledge. It was Nonaka' s theory of organisational
knowledge creation that gave the concept of tacit knowledge a new lease of life.
Largely due to the popularity of Nonaka's theory in organisation and management
thinking, the field of knowledge management theory affords a central position to the
concept of tacit knowledge. Tsoukas remarks the following about the use of the
concept of tacit knowledge in knowledge management theory:
Ever since Nonaka and Takeuchi have published their influential The
Knowledge-Creating Company, it is nearly impossible to find a
publication on organisational knowledge and knowledge
management that does not make a reference to, or use the term 'tacit
knowledge.'21
It is not only a question of popularity. The concept of tacit knowledge appears to be
the starting point for conceptualising the 'knowledge' that is to be the object of
knowledge management practices. In other words, the distinction between tacit and
explicit knowledge has become the default epistemology for knowledge management
theory. Stacey underscores this assessment by referring to literature that use the
concept of tacit knowledge, as the "mainstream literature on organisational
learninglknowledge creation."22He argues that "it has now become commonplace for
academics, managers, leaders and consultants to think and talk either within its terms
or in critique of it."23From this follows that the discourse on the merits of the concept
of tacit knowledge has the greatest relevance in terms of knowledge management
20 Teece, OJ. 1998. Capturing Value from Knowledge Assets: The New Economy, Markets for
Know-How, and Intangible Assets, California Management Review 40/ 3; Verona, G and 0
Ravasi. 2003. Unbundling Dynamic Capabilities: An Exploratory Study of Continuous
Product Innovation, Industrial and Corporate Change 12/3.
21 Tsoukas. Do We Really Understand Tacit Knowledge?: 3.
22 Stacey. Complex Responsive Processes in Organization: 13.
23 Stacey. Complex Responsive Processes in Organization: 13.
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theory, because it stands central in this body of theory. Hence the focal point of this
thesis centres on the way in which the concept of tacit knowledge functions in
knowledge management theory.
1.4 FOCUS AND DELIMITATION
To properly understand the implications of assigning the concept of tacit knowledge
a central role in knowledge management theory, the thesis will position the notion of
tacit knowledge against the backdrop of certain selected theories where the concept
played a key role. In other words, a single strand will be lifted from the broad
discourse employing the concept of tacit knowledge. This is the strand running from
Polanyi, through the appropriation of his concept by economists, to its adaptation by
organisation theorists, up until its being made the basis for certain approaches to
corporate knowledge management. The idea is not to map the entire range of uses
and accordingly discussions unrelated to the significance of tacit knowledge for
organisational knowledge will be left aside.
The two main moments of exposition are necessarily the work of Polanyi and
Nonaka. Polanyi is chosen as starting point, not only because he coined the term of
tacit knowledge, but also because Nonaka (and most knowledge management
theorists that employ a distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge), constantly
refer to Polanyi as a primary source. As pointed out earlier, there is also a growing
body of literature reviewing Nonaka's epistemological commitments in terms of
Polanyi's original conceptualisation of tacit knowledge."
The other central author is Ikujiro Nonaka, as his theory brought the concept of tacit
knowledge from the more or less theoretical fringe to the theoretical grounding of
24 This thesis differ from most of these approaches in that Nonaka or the knowledge
management theorists are not assessed in terms of Polanyi. This thesis does not assume
any correct or authoritative meaning of the concept of tacit knowledge. It simply compares
the way in which the concept functions, instead of trying to establish criteria for the
'correct conceptualisation' or 'legitimate application' of the concept.
8
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mainstream knowledge management. 25 Nonaka is widely recognised as one of the
primary knowledge management theorists and because his views are so influential,
his theory will be analysed in depth. Nonaka is not only responsible for the
popularisation of the concept of tacit knowledge in management studies, but his
theory also straddles knowledge management theory and the rest of organisation
theory.ë Furthermore, a significant number of knowledge management writers claim
to be using Nonaka's epistemology, which in tum relies on the dichotomy between
tacit and explicit knowledge.
The disparities with and modifications to Polanyi's conceptualisation of tacit
knowledge implied by Nonaka's view will be clarified by tracing incremental
changes to the concept through evolutionary economics and dynamic firm
capabilities approaches to organisations. The argument will be more than just an
overview of these differences in conceptualisation, as it will also show how these
differences came about and why, by highlighting the minor (yet cumulative)
adjustments to the concept as it is continually applied in related, but different,
theoretical settings.
Finally the implications for knowledge management theory and the differences
between Polanyi and those knowledge management writers following Nonaka will
be highlighted against the backdrop of the theoretical issues raised by the
comparison of the function of the concept in the theories of Nonaka and Polanyi. This
comparison enables one to understand a particular fault-line in knowledge
management theory (that has been commented on extensively by writers) arguing
that knowledge management theory lacks a coherent epistemology."
25 Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company
26 In chapter two it is argued that, although in retrospect Nonaka produced a classic in
knowledge management literature, his theory originated from the resource-based and
dynamic capabilities approaches to the theory of the firm.
27 Snowden. Complex Acts of Knowing; Stacey. Complex Responsive Processes in Organization;
Von Krogh, G, J Roos, and K Slocum. 1996.An Essay on Corporate Epistemology, in Von
Krogh, G and J Roos (eds.), Managing Knowledge: Perspectives on Cooperation and Competition.
London: Sage
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1.5 STRUCTURE,WELLSPRING,AND CONTENT
Itwill be argued that in the case of Polanyi, the concept of tacit knowledge primarily
stands for the structure of knowing. The content of knowing is the product of the
integrative structure and hence interwoven with the structure. Since this tacit
structure underlies all knowing, it makes little sense to think of the phenomenon of
tacit knowledge as content that could be converted into an explicit form.
Furthermore, it will be shown that the notion of knowledge transfer between
individuals (a fundamental assumption of mainstream knowledge management
theory) cannot be grafted onto Polanyi's conception of knowledge as arising from the
integration of subsidiary particulars.
It will be shown that Nonaka did not employ the concept of tacit knowledge
according to the original technical meaning of the concept as used by Polanyi. It will
be argued that Nonaka employs the concept of tacit knowledge to signify the
unstructured subjective realm that is the wellspring of individual creativity. An
important element of Nonaka's conceptualisation is the assumption that the
phenomenon of tacit knowledge is also a knowledge content that can be converted in
explicit knowledge and back again through a spiral process of interaction that is
firstly a series of knowledge conversions, but secondly also an amplification process
that tums individual insights into organisational knowledge.
The last chapter will then relate the conclusions reached regarding the functioning of
the concept of tacit knowledge in the theories of Polanyi and Nonaka, with the
reception of the concept in knowledge management theory.
Firstly, it will be argued that the function of the concept of tacit knowledge in
knowledge management theory seems to be closely linked to the way they
distinguish between information and knowledge. In other words, the concept of tacit
knowledge signifies the knowledge content that cannot be communicated as
information.
Secondly, it is shown how Nonaka's spiral process of knowledge interaction was
integrated into a sender-receiver model of communication, thus rooting the concept
10
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of tacit knowledge in the information processing paradigm that Nonaka's theory
proposed to criticise.
Thirdly, it is conjectured that knowledge management writers use the concept of tacit
knowledge in an attempt to bridge an epistemological gap left by the fact that
science-based epistemological discourse cannot directly be applied to organisational
knowledge. It is argued that the concept of tacit knowledge is attractive to knowledge
management writers, because it provides a way to ground organisational cognition in
organisational practices. This acts as an epistemological stop-gap measure, which
makes it possible to temporarily solve the epistemological problem posed by
organisational knowledge without genuinely engaging it.
Lastly, it is concluded that the epistemological problem posed by the phenomenon of
organisational knowledge cannot be solved without a shift in ontology. In other
words, appropriating the concept of tacit knowledge within an information
processing ontology is not a viable strategy for knowledge management theory that
is aimed at addressing the problem of knowledge creation.
11
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Chapter Two
MICHAEL POLANYI:
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE AND
TACIT KNOWLEDGE
I shall consider human knowledge by starting from the fact that we can know
more than we can tell.
Michael Polanyi, "Tacit Dimension."
2.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter considers Michael Polanyi's philosophical position and the specific
explanatory function of the concept of tacit knowledge in his argument. Polanyi is
mainly of interest because he coined the term "tacit knowing" and is repeatedly cited
in organisation and management literature almost every time that this concept is
used. To a reader interested in the concept of tacit knowledge it soon becomes clear
that in management studies the concept has been adapted considerably from
Polanyi's original conceptualisation. It was therefore not long before a number of
articles criticised management studies' conception, and particularly Nonaka and
Takeuchi's notion of a convertible tacit knowledge, following the observation that it
is contrary to Polanyi's notion of tacit knowledge as the basic form of knowledge
underlying all explicit knowledge."
28 Brohm. Bringing Polanyi onto the Theatre Stage; Leonard and Sensiper. The Role of Tacit
Knowledge in Group Innovation; Maasdorp, CHo The Theme of Tacit Knowledge in
Information and Knowledge Management, paper presented at the Second Biennial
12
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This chapter is yet another overview of Polanyi's conceptualisation of tacit
knowledge, but it differs from other similar articles in terms of the context and the
level on which Polanyi's conceptualisation is considered. Firstly, this chapter places
the concept of tacit knowledge in the wider context of Polanyi's philosophical
argument. Although management writers latched onto the concept of tacit
knowledge, Polanyi far more frequently uses the concept as a verb - tacit knowing - to
emphasise the fact that it is an act of integration, rather than content. There will be a
return to the difference between tacit knowledge and tacit knowing as it holds the
key to understanding the explanatory function of tacit knowinglknowledge in his
theory of personal knowledge.
However, for the moment it will suffice to say that in Polanyi's writings the act of
tacit knowing leads firstly to the notion of personal knowledge and secondly to the
notion of tacit knowledge. Personal knowledge can initially be defined as the
commitment on the part of a scientist to his or her yet unknown, but approaching
discovery. Strictly speaking, the concept of tacit knowledge relates to the complex
whole of skills and presuppositions that a scientist employs. The notion of personal
knowledge is a central part of Polanyi's critique of objectivism, while the concept of
tacit knowledge is part of the terminology that explains the mechanics of personal
knowledge. At first Polanyi preferred the term personal knowledge, because he
considered the notion of commitment as the basis of knowledge. Later when he
sought to anchor his argument in some sort of logical structure of knowing, he
started to prefer the concept of tacit knowing to that of personal knowledge and
commitment.
Writers who employ Polanyi's distinction between tacit and explicit usually refer
only to the technical aspect of tacit knowing." without including in their analysis his
broader programme - that of a post-critical philosophy. This chapter will go beyond
DISSAnet Conference, Pretoria, South Africa 2002; Schreinemakers and Essers. Nonaka's
Subjectivist Conception of Knowledge in Corporate Knowledge Management; Spender.
Competitive Advantage from Tacit Knowledge? Unpacking the Concept and lts Strategic
Implications; Tsoukas. Do We Really Understand Tacit Knowledge?
29 Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company; Spender. Competitive Advantage
from Tacit Knowledge? Unpacking the Concept and lts Strategic Implications.
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Polanyi's conceptualisation of tacit knowinglknowledge and consider the function of
the concept in his broader philosophical argument. This does not mean that the
analysis of Polanyi's argument will be exhaustive. Instead of offering a complete
exposition of Polanyi's philosophical position, this chapter will consider it only to the
extent necessary to highlight the particular function of the concept of tacit knowledge
in his argument.
Secondly, this chapter does not assume that Polanyi's specific use of the concept of
tacit knowledge carries a particular authority. Although there are notable differences
between Polanyi's specific conception of tacit knowledge and the use of his ideas in
organisation and management studies (especially knowledge management
literature), it does not imply that Polanyi's interpretation is authoritative.
Management writers might have misunderstood Polanyi or he might mean
something completely different with tacit knowledge than they do, but the validity of
a specific conception of tacit knowledge is not dependent on its origin. The fact that a
concept originally meant something quite different does not necessarily have any
direct bearing on the validity of later versions of it. At best, it indicates that in
management theories the concept of tacit knowledge does not have the same function
as in Polanyi's theory. For such an observation to count as criticism, specific
independent reasons are needed why the adaptation of the concept of tacit
knowledge by management writers were changes for the worse. By independent
reasons is meant reasons that are independent from the observation that tacit
knowledge is conceptualised differently in management studies than in Polanyi's
theory.
If Polanyi's conceptualisation of tacit knowledge is not authoritative, the question is
now why it is still worthwhile to consider his position. This framework does not
consider Polanyi as the originator or father of the concept of tacit knowledge and
goes beyond the technical aspects of Polanyi's conceptualisation to consider the
explanatory function of the concept of tacit knowledge in the broader context of
Polanyi's own theory as well. Unlike other arguments that note the discrepancy
between the meaning of the concept in management studies and its meaning in the
14
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theory where it originated, this framework considers Polanyi's theory alongside and
on the same level as subsequent theories that incorporated the concept of tacit
knowledge. Starting with Polanyi has the advantage of tracing subsequent
interpretations of the concept of tacit knowledge in management studies
chronologically. Furthermore, Polanyi's theory is more abstract than the theories in
management studies, which creates the opportunity to work through the full
complexities of the concept of tacit knowledge before tackling its role in a variety of
subsequent management theories. This approach prepares a comprehensive starting
point, based on an analysis of Polanyi's formulation of the concept, from which one
can trace and compare the changes in explanatory function in the theories that
adopted and adapted the concept.
2.2 APPROACHING POLANYI
The question of how to approach Polanyi's work on tacit knowledge remains
problematic. His own treatment of the concept of tacit knowledge is often
inconsistent. For example, he would sometimes use the terms tacit 'knowing' and
tacit 'knowledge' interchangeably and at other times, they seem to be two different
categories. Furthermore, later applications of Polanyi's concept seem to rely on his
earlier texts, while writers criticising these applications seem to rely on a particular
later text. This small section provides a brief overview of Polanyi's writings
concerning tacit knowinglknowledge. The approach that will be taken when
describing Polanyi's theory is also accounted for in this section. Inevitably, the
overview in the following section will introduce some concepts that form part of
Polanyi's terminology without explaining these terms fully. These concepts will
however be explained in the rest of the chapter.
Science, Faith and Society30 is the first work of Polanyi that applies the principles of
Gestalt psychology to scientific knowledge. In his major work, Personal Knouiledge.»
30 Polanyi, M. 1946. Science, Faith and Society. London: Oxford University Press
31 Polanyi. Personal Knowledge
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Polanyi introduced the notion of the tacit dimension as part of a critique of
objectivism in philosophy and science.v Following the publication of Personal
Knowledge, Polanyi restated and refined his ideas around the tacit dimension in five
articles and two further books. Knowing and Being33 argues that tacit knowing is the
act of perception that brings the knower into contact with reality. Polanyi would say
that Knowing and Being explores the "ontological claims" of the notion of tacit
knowing." The following year Tacit Knowing: Its bearing on some problems of
philosophyJ5 touched on a number of philosophical problems - especially on what
Polanyi calls the "phenomenal aspect" of tacit knowing. In describing the act of
integrating particulars into a whole, The Logic of Tacit lnjerence'" develops the
"functional aspect" of tacit knowing. Another article titled The Structure of
Consciousnese" elaborates on the relationship between the two kinds of awareness
that forms the basic structure of tacit knowing. This article also contains improved
examples of tacit integration to correct certain misconceptions about the difference
between tacit and explicit knowledge. In The Tacit Dimension», Polanyi integrated the
different structural aspects of tacit knowing. In the first chapter, the logical structure
of tacit knowing is unpacked: consisting of functional and phenomenal relations and
semantic and ontological aspects. If the first chapter focused on epistemology, the
second chapter of The Tacit Dimension is concerned with ontology and through the
concept of "emergence" Polanyi seeks to link knowing and the known. Polanyi
32 Brahm. Bringing Polanyi onto the Theatre Stage. The fact that the notion of tacit
knowledge figures as part of an argument against objectivism is not unrelated to the issue
concerning management studies alleged misreading of Polanyi. Brahm observes that most
management literature draws on objectivist assumptions and therefore most management
models wherein tacit knowledge figures, experience some sort of epistemological
inconsistency. Similarly, Stacey argues that most of knowledge management theory is still
trapped in the subject/object split. See, Stacey. Complex Responsive Processes in Organization
33 Polanyi, M. 1961.Knowing and Being, in Grene, M (ed.), Knowing and Being: Essays by
Michael Polanyi: 123-37.London: Routledge
34 Grene, M (ed.), 1969a. Knowing and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi. London: Routledge: xv.
35 Polanyi, M. 1962. Tacit Knowing: lts Bearing on Some Problems of Philosophy, in Grene, M
(ed.), Knowing and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi: 159-80. London: Routledge
36 Polanyi, M. 1964. Logic of Tacit Inference, in Grene, M (ed.), Knowing and Being: Essays by
Michael Polanyi: 139-57.London: Routledge
37 Grene (ed.). Knowing and Being: 315-28; Polanyi, M. 1965. The Structure of Consciousness,
in Grene, M (ed.), Knowing and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi: 211-24. London: Routledge
38 Polanyi, M. 1967. The Tacit Dimension. Garden City NY: Doubleday and Company
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elaborated on the "semantic aspect" in Sense-giving and Sense-reading= The last book
in which tacit knowledge features is Meaning,40 which was published with Harry
Prosch. This book is essentially a collection of lectures that Polanyi delivered in three
lecture series that extended the notion of personal knowledge to other realms of
meaning.
Marjorie Grene, the editor of a collection of Polanyi's papers, considers the statement
of the theory of tacit knowledge in the first chapter of The Tacit Dimension the most
comprehensive and the clearest.f Most discussions of the concept of tacit knowledge
rely substantially (or almost exclusively) on the argument as it appears in The Tacit
Dimension= Instead of starting with the larger theory as found in Personal Knowledge,
the logic of explanation might be best served if the argument in The Tacit Dimension is
used as an entry point to grasping what Polanyi meant by tacit knowinglknowledge.
As the argument covers the structure of tacit knowing and the sub-themes of the
functional, phenomenal, semantic and the ontological aspects of tacit knowledge are
encountered, the rest of Polanyi's articles will be weaved into the explanation. This
will conclude the technical treatment of the concept of tacit knowledge. At this point
we are only concerned with Polanyi's epistemology, not with his ontology. Thereafter
the function of tacit knowledge in terms of Polanyi's larger argument against
objectivism in science will be considered. After that the elements relevant to
management studies can be distilled and implications can be drawn. The chapter will
close with speculations on possible theoretical enlargements of Polanyi's theory of
tacit knowing.
39 Polanyi, M. 1967. Sense-Giving and Sense-Reading, in Grene, M (ed.), Knowing and Being:
Essays by Michael Polanyi: 181-207.London: Routledge
40 Polanyi, Mand H Prosch. 1975.Meaning. Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press
41 Grene (ed.). Knowing and Being: xiv.
42 Interestingly, Personal Knowledge is cited as least as much as The Tacit Dimension. A quick
search of the social science citation index revealed that Personal Knowledge (1958) has
been cited 1052 times, while The Tacit Dimension (1966 and the 1967 paperback edition)
had been cited 1019 times. One can assume that often times the two works are cited
together, but the broader argument of Personal Knowledge is conspicuously absent from
most management studies expositions of Polanyi.
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2.3 POLANYI'S STARTING POINT
Polanyi argues that there is a common structure underlying all kinds of knowledge.v
From this assertion follows that the usual practical/theoretical dichotomy is not
applicable when it comes to epistemology. His argument in Personal Knowledge is to
show that scientific knowledge is ultimately also grounded in personal
commitment+ In the articles and books following the publication of Personal
Knowledge, Polanyi develops a terminology to accurately describe the logical
structure that underlies all our knowledge. Through refining the terminology and the
examples he uses to explain the terminology, Polanyi's argument regarding tacit
knowing is strengthened. The emphasis of the argument moves from personal
commitment as an aspect of all knowledge towards a logical structure underlying all
forms of knowledge.
This focus on the logical structure of all knowledge is also the reason why Polanyi
prefers to speak of knowing rather than of knowledge. He states that, "I shall always
speak of knowing ...to cover both practical and theoretical knowledge."45 This might
partially solve the tacit knowledge/knowing dilemma, when reading Polanyi, but
even so he is still not consistent and often refers to "tacit knowledge" as well= - once
even in the title of an article, "Tacit knowledge and its bearing on some problems of
philosophy."47 It has to be assumed that Polanyi does not consider knowledge as a
content separate from awareness, which is integrated by the structure of knowing. By
contrast, in management studies, the emphasis is always on tacit knowledge and as
will become clear in subsequent chapters, it is not understood as a common structure
43 Polanyi. Tacit Knowing: lts Bearing on Some Problems of Philosophy: 144;Polanyi. Sense-
Giving and Sense-Reading: 181; Polanyi and Prosch. Meaning: 33-45.
44 Polanyi. Personal Knowledge: 59,300,02-3,24.
45 Polanyi. The Tacit Dimension: 7.
46 References to tacit knowledge include, Polanyi. Knowing and Being: 133; Polanyi. Logic of
Tacit Inference: 144; Polanyi. Sense-Giving and Sense-Reading: 181,87,95,97;Polanyi and
Prosch. Meaning: 34,43,46-48,149,45.;Whilst references to tacit knowing include, Polanyi.
Knowing and Being: 138;Polanyi. Tacit Knowing: lts Bearing on Some Problems of
Philosophy: 161,67,71;Polanyi. Logic of Tacit Inference: 140,51; Polanyi. The Structure of
Consciousness: 212,18; Polanyi. Sense-Giving and Sense-Reading: 182,83,94,95,99,204;
Polanyi and Prosch. Meaning: 33,41,42,33-34,37.
47 Polanyi. Tacit Knowing: lts Bearing on Some Problems of Philosophy.
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of knowing, but rather as a content of knowing that is difficult to communicate as
information.ë Even though Polanyi is referenced in these cases, it is an obvious
misreading.
There are three themes to Polanyi's notion of tacit knowing. He calls them the
functional-, phenomenal- and semantic aspects of tacit knowing." Under the
"functional aspect of tacit knowing," Polanyi extends insights from Gestalt
perception to argue that the integration of particulars into wholes is the common
structure of all knowledge, whether practical or theoretical.v Under the
"phenomenological aspect of tacit knowing," he uses the basic model from Gestalt
48 Ambrosini, Vand C Bowman. 2001. Tacit Knowledge: Some Suggestions for
Operationalisation, Journal of Management Studies 38; Athanassiou, Nand 0 Nigh. 1999.
The Impact of Us Company Internationalization on Top Management Team Advice
Networks: A Tacit Knowledge Perspective, Strategic Management Journal 20; Baumard, P.
1999. Tacit Knowledge in Organizations. London: Sage; Bennett, RH. 1998. The Importance of
Tacit Knowledge in Strategic Deliberations and Decisions, Management Decision 36/ 9;
Choo, CWo 1998. The Knowing Organization: How Organizations Use Information to Construct
Meaning, Create Knowledge, and Make Decisions. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Choo,
CWo 2000. Working with Knowledge: How Information Professionals Help Organizations
Manage What They Know, Library Management 21/ 8; Eraut, M. 2000. Non-Formal Learning
and Tacit Knowledge in Professional Work, British Journal of Educational Psychology 70;
Hackley, CE. 1999. Tacit Knowledge and the Epistemology of Expertise in Strategic
Marketing Management, European Journal of Marketing 33/ 7/8; Haldin-Herrgard, T. 2000.
Difficulties in Diffusion of Tacit Knowledge in Organizations, Journal of Intellectual Capital
1/4; Hannabuss, S. 2000. Narrative Knowledge: Eliciting Organisational Knowledge from
Storytelling, Aslib Proceedings 52/ 10; Herschel, RT, H Nemati, and 0 Steiger. 2001. Tacit to
Explicit Knowledge Conversion: Knowledge Exchange Protocols, Journal of Knowledge
Management 5/1; Jankowicz, D. 2001. Why Does Subjectivity Make Us Nervous? Making
the Tacit Explicit, Journal of Intellectual Capital 2/ 1; Johannessen, J-A, JOlaisen, and BOisen.
2001. Mismanagement of Tacit Knowledge: The Importance of Tacit Knowledge, the
Danger of Information Technology, and What to Do About It, International Journal of
Information Management 21/ 1; Leonard and Sensiper. The Role of Tacit Knowledge in
Group Innovation; Linde, e. 2001. Narrative and Social Tacit Knowledge, Journal of
Knowledge Management 5/ 2; Lubit, R. 2001. Tacit Knowledge and Knowledge Management:
The Keys to Sustainable Competitive Advantage, Organizational Dynamics 29/4; Lueg, e.
2001. Information, Knowledge, and Networked Minds, Journal of Knowledge Management 5/
2; O'Brien, Re. 1995. Employee Involvement in Performance Improvement: A
Consideration of Tacit Knowledge, Commitment and Trust, Employee Relations 17/3; Saint-
Onge, H. 1996. Tacit Knowledge: The Key to the Strategic Alignment of Intellectual
Capital, Strategy and Leadership 24/2; Schamer, CO. 2001. Self-Transcending Knowledge:
Sensing and Organizing around Emerging Opportunities, Journal of Knowledge Management
5/1; Schariq, SZ. 1999. How Does Knowledge Transform as It Is Transferred? Speculations
on the Possibility of a Cognitive Theory of Knowledge Landscapes, Journal of Knowledge
Management 3/ 4; Smith, EA. 2001. The Role of Tacit and Explicit Knowledge in the
Workplace, Journal of Knowledge Management 5/ 4; Spender. Competitive Advantage from
Tacit Knowledge? Unpacking the Concept and Its Strategic Implications.
49 Polanyi. Logic of Tacit Inference: 141; Polanyi. The Structure of Consciousness: 212,18.
50 Polanyi. Logic of Tacit Inference: 141; Polanyi. The Structure of Consciousness: 212,18.
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and applies it to skills, tactile perception (the use of tools and probes) and even the
use of sensory organs.» The last theme, concerning the "semantic aspect," relates to
the implications this general structure of knowledge has for the way in which
meaning is constructed or derived.v The following sections use these themes to
explain the logical structure of tacit knowing as Polanyi presented it.
2.4 PERCEPTION - THE FUNCTIONAL ASPECT OF TACIT
KNOWING
The common structure underlying all knowledge consists of the integration of
particulars into a whole that becomes the meaning of the integrated particulars.
Polanyi looked towards Gestalt perception as a model to describe the integration of
the parts into a whole. Using the recognition of faces as an example, Polanyi shows
that we can integrate the many particulars that make up a person's face into a whole
(in this case a physiognomy) that enables us to recognise the whole face amongst
many others." Still when asked we are often unable to identify the parts that make
up the whole. "Gestalt psychology has demonstrated that we may know a
physiognomy by integrating our awareness of its particulars without being able to
identify these particulars."54
In the case of recognising a physiognomy, like the recognition facial expressions,
the particulars themselves are not clearly definable. Polanyi calls this the
"unspecifiability" of particulars. 55 Unspecifiability is not limited to cases where the
particulars themselves are not clearly definable. Consider that a "comprehensive
entity" is made up of particulars that are perceptually integrated into a whole. Efforts
to define such a comprehensive entity will firstly aim at identifying its particulars
51 Polanyi. Logic of Tacit Inference: 141; Polanyi. The Structure of Consciousness: 212,18.
52 Polanyi. Logic of Tacit Inference: 145; Polanyi. The Structure of Consciousness: 212,18;
Polanyi. Sense-Giving and Sense-Reading: 182.
53 Polanyi. The Tacit Dimension: 4-5.
54 Polanyi. The Tacit Dimension: 6.
55 Polanyi. Knowing and Being: 124-27;Polanyi. The Tacit Dimension: 6.
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and secondly attempt to describe the relation between those particulars. 56Sometimes
the set of particulars and the relation between the particulars are observed separately.
In the case of topographical features recognisable from the air that are
unrecognisable from the ground, the particulars themselves are clearly visible, but
the relation between them is only observable from the air. Polanyi uses the example
of prehistoric settlement sites that were discovered from the air. 57Unlike in the case
of recognising faces, the particulars themselves are clearly visible in this case. It can
be said that in the case of recognising physiognomies (faces or facial expressions),
some particulars are not clearly definable. One might be able to point out a large
nose or bushy eyebrows, but there will always be a residue of unspecified particulars
when it comes to the recognition of faces. In the case of the discovery of prehistoric
settlement sites from the air the particulars are clearly definable, but seen in isolation
they appear different. 58A related example from Gestalt psychology is the case of a
colour appearing differently depending on the background against which one views
it.
Consider now a case where the particulars are clearly definable and where they do
not appear in isolation, yet describing the relation between particulars remains
problematic. Polanyi uses the examples of anatomy, geological topography and the
relations between parts of a complex machine. 59In the case of anatomy, one can
often identify the several organs, but their "mutual relation inside the body can be
grasped only by a sustained effort of the imagination, based on the partial aspects
revealed by successive stages of dissection.,,6o
Instances of unspecifiability built into the structure of the perception of
comprehensive entities are therefore either a case of the particulars themselves being
unclear, or a case of the relations between particulars being unclear. These cases of
unspecifiability do not disprove the claims Polanyi makes about the structure of
perception, but instead leads him to argue that the basic form of integration is tacit.
56 Polanyi. Knowing and Being: 123.
57 Polanyi. Knowing and Being: 123.
58 Polanyi. Knowing and Being: 124.
59 Polanyi. Knowing and Being: 124.
60 Polanyi. Knowing and Being: 124.
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Proximal and Distal Terms of Tacit Knowing
According to Polanyi the basic structure of tacit knowing "always involves two
things, or two kinds of things. We may call them the two terms of tacit knowing."61
These two terms are the subsidiary particulars, forming the first or proximal term of
tacit knowing, and the meaning that these particulars jointly form when tacitly
integrated, which presents the second or distal term of tacit knowing. "We may call
the first term proximal, and the second, distal. It is the proximal term, then, of which
we have a knowledge that we may not be able to tell."62 Polanyi referred to
psychological experiments concerning a phenomenon called "subception" in which
volunteers were subjected to electric shock accompanying a verbal or visual sign.
With the current later switched off, the subjects still correctly anticipated the electric
shock when presented with the signs usually accompanying the shock. Curiously, the
subjects were unable to identify the signs explicitly or to give reasons for their
anticipation.v Polanyi took experiments in subception as empirical proof of the basic
structure of knowing as he proposed it. In his terminology, the electric shock
represented the second or distal term of tacit knowing and the sign accompanying
the shock the first or proximal term of tacit knowing. "Such is the functional relation
between the two terms of tacit knowing: we know the first term only by relying on our
awareness of it for attending to the second."64
We may say ...that we are aware of the proximal term of an act of tacit
knowing in the appearance of its distal term; we are aware of that from
which we are attending to another thing, in the appearance of that
thing. We may call this the phenomenal structure of tacit knowing."
The proximal term of tacit knowing is the clues or parts that are subsidiarily known
and that which is focally known is the distal term of tacit knowing. The proximal and
61 Polanyi. The Tacit Dimension: 9.
62 Polanyi. The Tacit Dimension: 10.
63 Polanyi. The Tacit Dimension: 7-8.
64 Polanyi. The Tacit Dimension: 10.
65 Polanyi. The Tacit Dimension: 11.
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the distal terms are joined together by tacit knowing. It is not merely a case of seeing
the parts in their joint appearance - "the proximal term consist of things seen in
isolation, and the distal term consist of the same things seen as a coherent entity."66
Tacit knowing integrates the subsidiary particulars into the focal whole (or the
proximal into the distal). "We may say then that in tacit knowing we always attend
from the proximal to the distal term."67
Polanyi goes beyond Gestalt psychology's application of this insight about the way
we integrate things when we perceive as the basic model for his epistemology.
Gestalt psychology has assumed that perception ...takes place through
the spontaneous equilibration of its particulars ...However; I am
looking at Gestalt...as the outcome of an active shaping of experience
performed in the pursuit of knowledge. This shaping or integrating I
hold to be the great and indispensable tacit power by which all
knowledge is discovered, and once discovered, is held to be true."
In the subsequent sections it will be shown how Polanyi applies the example of the
integration of particulars into a whole when perceiving an entity to all the other
domains of knowledge. The first step is to show the similarities between the structure
of perception and the structure of skills. Polanyi will argue that the individual
muscular acts that make up a skill are the particulars being integrated into skilful
performance.
2.5 ACTION - THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL ASPECT OF
TACIT KNOWING
The second strand in Polanyi's argument concerns the "structural kinship" between
the acts of knowing and doing. In fact, in Personal Knowledge, Polanyi starts the
66 Polanyi. Logic of Tacit Inference: 140.
67 Polanyi. Logic of Tacit Inference: 141.
68 Polanyi. The Tacit Dimension: 6.
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argument with an analysis of skills.v? In the same way that we combine unspecifiable
particulars into a recognisable whole when recognising comprehensive entities, a
"skill combines elementary muscular acts which are not identifiable, according to
relations we cannot define.T" Polanyi says that although "we may prefer to speak of
understanding a comprehensive entity and of mastering a skill. We do use the two
words nearly as synonyms. Actually we speak equally of grasping a subject or an
art."71
Returning to the two stages in the recognition of a comprehensive entity, one effort
"proceeds from a recognition of a whole towards an identification of its
particulars;"n the other effort proceeds from "the recognition of a group of
presumed particulars towards the grasping of their relation in the whole.,,73 These
two efforts correspond with the difference between analysis and integration.
According to Polanyi, analysis of a comprehensive entity involves "concentrating
our attention on the particulars't" and this temporarily weakens our sense of its
coherent existence. Integration involves a shift of our awareness towards the whole
and then "the particulars tend to become submerged in the whole.,,75
Polanyi is of the opinion that "[t]here is a close analogy between the elucidation of a
comprehensive entity and the mastering of a skill."76Just as one's understanding of a
comprehensive entity can be deepened through alternate analysis and re-integration,
it often helps the mastery of a skill to break it down into its constituent motions and
to practice them in isolation, before attempting to integrate them into one flowing
sequence." Take for example piano students practicing first the melody with the
right hand and then the harmony with the left before attempting integration. Another
69 Polanyi. Personal Knowledge: chapter 4.
70 Polanyi. The Tacit Dimension: 8.
71 Polanyi. Knowing and Being: 126.
72 Polanyi. Knowing and Being: 125.
73 Polanyi. Knowing and Being: 125.
74 Polanyi. Knowing and Being: 125.
75 Polanyi. Knowing and Being: 125.
76 Polanyi. Knowing and Being: 125.
77 Polanyi. Knowing and Being: 126.
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example is that of athletes practicing sections of movements that make up a complex
stroke repeatedly to improve overall performance.
Just as in the case of recognising comprehensive entities, there are limits to the
specifiability of skills. The constituent motions of a skill do not comprise the entire
skill. "Experience shows that no skill can be acquired by learning its constituent
motions separately."78 Polanyi uses the example of the touch of a pianist to illustrate
the limits on specifiability in the case of skilful performance. It is only after mastering
a skill that analysis can improve performance, because isolation of the particulars (in
this case the constituent motions) seem to alter these particulars. The pianist
concentrating on his fingers, instead of on the music, find that the "identification of
the constituent motions of a skill tends to paralyse performance."?
Here again the particulars of a skill appear to be unspecifiable, but this
time not in the sense of being ignorant of them. For in this case we can
ascertain the details of our performance quite well, and its
unspecifiability consists in the fact that the performance is paralysed if
we focus our attention on these details. We may describe such a
performance as logically unspecifiable, for we can show that in a sense
the specification of the particulars would logically contradict what is
implied in the performance or the context in question."
Polanyi's other frequent example of this paralysis is that of swimmers sinking when
they think of exactly how they swim." Polanyi also cites the example of Blondin the
tightrope walker who stressed the importance of concentrating on getting off on the
other end of the rope, rather than on walking the rope itself." However skilful
78 Polanyi. Knowing and Being: 126.
79 Polanyi. Knowing and Being: 126.
80 Polanyi. Personal Knowledge: 56.
81 Polanyi. Personal Knowledge: 49-50,56;Polanyi and Prosch. Meaning: 40.
82 Polanyi and Prosch. Meaning: 36.
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performance can easily be restored through "turning our attention away from the
particulars and towards their joint purpose."83
As in the case of integrating particulars into a whole when recognising
comprehensive entities, the act of integrating constituent motions into skilful
performance is itself unspecifiable. Imitating a skilful performer may offer guidance,
but the "feel" of skilful performance is something that one has to discover for
oneself.ê- The unspecifiable act of integration, Polanyi calls tacit integration."
2.5.1 Two KINDS OF MEANING
Thus far the common structure of knowledge holds for cases where the isolated
particulars and what they jointly mean are not clearly separated in space; as in the
case of recognising comprehensive entities, such as faces or facial expressions, or
topographical anatomies or geographies, or even complex machinery and so forth.
The same common structure also holds for skills and their constituent motions.
Polanyi terms these "physiognostic" examples and distinquishes them from
examples of "telegnostic" meaning, where the uncomprehended particulars are
spatially removed from the whole that signifies their meaning." The challenge is to
extend the application of the common integrative structure of knowledge to
telegnostic meanings as well. Returning to the case of visual perception, Polanyi
argues, "a major part of the particulars shaping the sight of an external object are
internal actions and stimuli."87Obviously, we can control our eye muscles and direct
our eyes, but as internal particulars shaping perception of the whole, the movement
of our eye muscles or the contraction of the iris is not clearly observable in itself. In
other words, the internal actions and stimuli of our sensory organs are also
unspecifiable particulars of perception. This unspecifiability of the particulars of
perception is different from the unspecifiability of the physiognostic examples in the
83 Polanyi. Knowing and Being: 126.
84 Polanyi. Knowing and Being: 126.
85 Polanyi and Prosch. Meaning: 39,40-41,42,62.
86 Polanyi. Knowing and Being: 128.
87 Polanyi. Knowing and Being: 127.
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sense that the uncomprehended particulars are inside our own body and what they
jointly mean (what we see and hear) is projected into a space outside of the body."
Extending the common structure from physiognostic to telegnostic integrated
meanings, makes it possible for Polanyi to extend Gestalt's insights about visual
perception to tactile perception and to use tactile perception as a bridge to
performance. It becomes clear that the use of tools and probes also display the
structure of telegnostic integrated meanings.
The actual impact of the tool on our palm and fingers is unspecifiable
in the same sense in which the muscular acts composing skilful
performance are unspecifiable; we are aware of them in terms of the
tool's action on its object, that is, in the comprehensive entity into
which we integrate them."
Polanyi employs a number of examples to illustrate this point. A person using a
hammer to drive nails, actually feels the hammer driving the nail. Someone wielding
a hammer is aware of the hammer and the nail. The focus of attention would be on
the nail and the effects of the hammer on it. One tries to drive the nail as straight and
effectively as possible. At the same time, one is aware of the feeling of the hammer in
one's palm, but the attention of the hammer is secondary to what happens to the
focus of one's attention - the nail. "I know the feelings in the palm of my hand by
relying on them for attending to the hammer hitting the nail. I may say that I have a
subsidiary awareness of the feelings in my hand which is merged into my focal
awareness of my driving the nail."?" In a similar way, a rower pulling on an oar feels
the resistance of the water, rather than the shaft of the oar, or when using a paper-
knife we feel the blade cutting the pages, rather than the pressures of the handle on
the palm of the hand."
88 Polanyi. Knowing and Being: 127,29.
89 Polanyi. Knowing and Being: 127.
90 Polanyi and Prosch. Meaning: 33.
91 Polanyi. Knowing and Being: 127.
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Polanyi's other example is that of a blind person exploring a cavity with a probe. The
person is only tacitly aware of the changing pressures that can be felt on the palm as
the tip of the probe hits the edges of the cavity. The focus of the attention remains on
the cavity itself. The sensations felt in the palm only get their meaning in terms of the
contact between the tip of the probe and the edges of the cavity. The blind person
projects the sensations in his/her palm towards the end of the probe and the cavity."
There is of course a difference between a blind person using a cane or probe for
walking and someone that has never before used a stick to help them to walk.
Someone skilled with a walking stick is much more successful in focussing on the tip
of the probe, rather than on the feelings in the palm. In Polanyi's language, one can
say that the skilful use of tools (like probes) depends on ones ability to interiorise the
subsidiary elements (such as the sensations in the palm) to such an extent that clear
focus on the activity (such as the edges of the cavity) becomes possible.
2.5.2 INDWELLING AS THE INTERIORISATION OF PARTICULARS
The term Polanyi uses to describe an advanced ability of interiorisation of particulars
is indioeiling» The paradigm of indwelling extends the insight about the telegnostic
nature of sensory perception to the use of tools. Just as one dwells inside one's body
in order to perceive the world outside, the skilful user dwells in his/her tools. The
paradigm of indwelling can be extended to cover all of what we do.
We may say that when we learn to use a language, or a probe, or a
tool, and thus make ourselves aware of these things as we are of our
body, we interiorize these things and make ourselves dwell in them."
From the point of view of logical structure, Polanyi does not make a distinction
between how we use our sensory organs, or physical tools, but the important insight
is that he also does not distinguish between physical tools and intangible tools such
as conceptual frameworks, theories, or even cultural knowledge. All these things
92 Polanyi. The Tacit Dimension: 12.
93 Polanyi. The Tacit Dimension: 16.
94 Polanyi. Logic of Tacit Inference: 148.
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share the same basic logical structure of tacit integration. New theoretical knowledge
for example needs to be assimilated (or understood) before a student can apply it
properly (by dwelling in the theory). In the case of a theory the clues from which the
theory derives subsidiarily contribute to the overall theory, which in tum gives
meaning to the clues. Polanyi can therefore extend this basic structure to include new
scientific knowledge:
We may say that scientific discovery reduces our focal awareness of
observations into a subsidiary awareness of them, by shifting our
attention from them to their theoretical coherence."
2.6 MEANING - THE SEMANTIC ASPECT OF TACIT
KNOWING
2.6.1 Two KINDS OF AWARENESS AND DIRECTEDNESS (INTENTIONALITY)
It was argued that both physiognostic and telegnostic meanings consist of the
integration of a set of particulars into a whole that becomes the meaning of the
particulars. The question is now what exactly is the relation between a set of
particulars and the comprehensive entity into which it is integrated. Polanyi shows
that we can notice particulars in two different ways. We can sometimes observe the
particulars in themselves, by focussing on the isolated particulars. In this case, we
notice them uncomprehendingly, because we are focally aware of them. We can also
notice the entity to which they contribute, usually by directing our attention beyond
the particulars to their participation in the whole. In this case, we notice the
particulars understandingly as part of the whole, and we are only subsidiarily aware
of the particulars themselves.
95 Polanyi. Logic of Tacit Inference: 140.
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"These two kinds of awareness - the subsidiary and the focal- are
fundamental to the tacit apprehension of coherence .... [Gestalt] has
shown that within a whole its parts have a functional appearance
which they lack in isolation and that we can cause the merging of the
parts in the whole by shifting our attention from the parts to the
whole."96
Polanyi makes it clear that the subsidiary and the focal are not two degrees of
attention. He cites the case of the diagnosis of an illness - "when, after having first
looked uncomprehendingly at the symptoms of a patient, we hit on the diagnosis of
his illness, his symptoms become meaningful without becoming less noticeable.'?" It
is in fact two wholly different kinds of attention given to the same particulars. The
difference is semantic, because when we are focally aware of the particulars they are
relatively meaningless, while when noticed subsidiarily in terms of the
comprehensive entity to which they contribute, the particulars gain in meaning."
Tacit knowing concerns the integration of two types of awareness, rather than the
conscious accessibility of the clues that make up the entity perceived. Whether the
clues are marginal or subliminal or clearly visible does not alter the structure of tacit
knowing.
96 Polanyi. Logic of Tacit Inference: 140.
97 Polanyi. Knowing and Being: 128.
98 Polanyi. Knowing and Being: 128.
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The appearance of a thing at the centre of my attention depends on
clues to which I am not directly attending. These clues are of two
kinds. There are some that we cannot experience in themselves. The
contraction of my eye muscles or the stirring of my labyrinth organ I
cannot observe directly. These clues are subliminal. Other clues ... [that]
I normally see ... from the comer of my eye, and I could observe them
directly, if I wanted to. We may call such clues marginal. To neither
kind of clues do I attend directly, yet both kinds contribute to the
apparent reality of the object on which my attention is focused. We
may say that my awareness of both kind of clues is subsidiary to my focal
awareness of that object.99
The case of the diagnosis of a disease whose symptoms are clearly visible for all to
see, illustrates that even when the clues are clearly visible, the structure of knowing
remains the same. As a result it follows that equating tacit knowledge with
unconscious or preconscious knowledge'?" is a misconception.
I have said already in Personal Knowledge and have continued to
emphasize since then, that it is a mistake to identify subsidiary
awareness with unconscious or preconscious awareness, or with the
Jamesian fringe of awareness. What makes an awareness subsidiary is
the function that it fulfills; it can have any degree of consciousness, so
long as it functions as a clue to the object of our focal attention.P'
Polanyi tried to dispel this misconception by introducing the example of perception
of a three-dimensional picture through the use of stereoscopic photographs.v" The
particulars are clear and consciously available in the form of the two stereoscopic
99 Polanyi. Logic of Tacit Inference: 140.
100 As Reber is wont to do when referring to implicit learning as the "cognitive unconscious".
See Reber. Implicit Learning and Tacit Knowledge; Reber. Implicit Learning and Tacit
Knowledge: An Essay on the Cognitive Unconscious
101 Polanyi. The Tacit Dimension: 95-96.
102 Polanyi. Tacit Knowing: Its Bearing on Some Problems of Philosophy: 167; Polanyi. Logic
of Tacit Inference: 144; Polanyi. The Structure of Consciousness: 211,12; Polanyi. Sense-
Giving and Sense-Reading: 184,89,91,93;Polanyi and Prosch. Meaning: 34,62.
31
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
photographs, but integration into the three-dimensional whole is made possible only
by dwelling in the stereoscopic glasses.103
2.6.2 MEANING AS THE DIRECTION OF THE VECTOR OF INTEGRATION.
"[I]n an act of tacit knowing we attend from something for attending to
something else; namely, from the first term to the second term of the
tacit relation."l04
Polanyi calls the structure of tacit knowing "from-to knowing". This gives tacit
knowing it's "veetoral quality"105or directedness. Tacit knowing is directed from the
particulars to the whole and this directedness makes possible the tacit inference that
gives the particulars their meaning.
We have seen that by attending from the proximal to the distal, we
cause a transformation in the appearance of both: they acquire an
integrated appearance .... the parts of the whole merge their isolated
appearance into the appearance of the whole. This is the phenomenal
accompaniment of tacit knowing, which tells us that we have a real
coherent entity before US.106
Looking back, the functional aspect is the from-to relation of subsidiary particulars to
a focal whole. We only know the particulars in the sense that we rely on our
awareness of them in our attending to something else. The interplay between our
focal and background awareness has the character of vectoral inference - moving
from the subsidiary particulars to the focal target. The phenomenal aspect involves
the transformation of the subsidiary awareness into a new sensory perception by
integrating all the subsidiaries into a whole. The process of integration actually
103Elsewhere Polanyi uses the example of stereoscopic pictures to argue that slightly
conflicting clues are tacitly integrated. See, Grene (ed.). Knowing and Being: 167-68.
104Polanyi. The Tacit Dimension: 10.
105Polanyi. Logic of Tacit Inference: 141.
106 Polanyi. Logic of Tacit Inference: 141.
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establishes a coherent appearance. The semantic aspect refers to the production of
meaning by the functional relation between the parts and the whole. Thus the
integrated whole is the (joint) meaning of the subsidiaries.
This integration of the subsidiary particulars into the whole is the result of an act of
the knower. No such integration is possible without a knower to link the two forms
of awareness. The presence of a person in all knowledge is a logical necessity,
because knowledge has a structure that relies on two kinds of awareness that can
only be present in a person. In this sense Polanyi fuses knowledge and knowing. No
knowledge can exist separately from an integrating act. Therefore all knowledge is
personal and all knowing is action.
2.6.3 IMPLICATIONS OF TACIT KNOWING AS THE STRUCTURE OF KNOWING
Tacit integration is irreversible.
While it is possible to reverse explicit integration, it is impossible with tacit
integration. Retracing the steps of explicit integration might be difficult, but it is
always possible. Take for example the analysis of a logical puzzle or a mathematical
problem. It is possible to move from the answer towards the constituent elements
making up the answer and back again. In the case of a mathematical proof, one can
move from the premises to the conclusion and from the conclusion to the premises. It
is because the set of premises and the conclusion are linked logically to one another
and each of these links can be analysed separately. However tacit integration is not
retraceable in this way. Consider the examples of skilful performance again; once a
skill is mastered one can never be ignorant of it again. This is true of riding a bicycle,
as it is true of playing the piano. Using Polanyi's language, it is possible to shift ones
attention from the focus of one's activity to the subsidiary elements and in this way
cause the paralysis of an otherwise skilful performance - hence Polanyi's examples of
pianists faltering and swimmers sinking.v' But this paralysis is only temporary and
the skilful activity can be restored by shifting the focus back to the object of the
performance. While subsidiary elements can be brought into focus, this change of
107 Polanyi. Personal Knowledge: 49-50,56.
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focus also changes the nature of the activity. Logically this is implied in Polanyi's
argument, since all focal attention is grounded in subsidiary awareness. It therefore
follows that shifting one's focus from the comprehensive entity or the focal activity to
the underlying particulars can only take place against the backdrop of another set of
subsidiary elements. This brings us to the next point.
Tacit integration is the basic form of integration
Polanyi's conclusion is that logically all knowledge is grounded in some form of tacit
knowing. There is no such thing as a wholly explicit knowledge. The notion of a
wholly explicit knowledge, even in the case of mathematical theorems, is therefore
absurd. Not only is there not a sharp division between tacit and explicit knowledge,
representing the difference as on a continuum or a spectrum with a tacit and an
explicit polel08 is also a misrepresentation, because tacit knowing underlies other
forms of knowing, providing a background for that which happens to emerge as the
focus of awareness. It also follows that rather than a transformation of tacit
knowledge into explicitl", it would be more correct to speak of a shift in awareness
which produces a new focal point (explicit), turning previously explicit knowledge
into a supporting tacit background.
It is already clear that just following Polanyi's basic argument regarding the logical
structure of knowledge, shows up a number of differences in interpretation between
Polanyi and theorists that claim to use his epistemology. In the next two chapters on
108 Leonard and Sensiper came up with an interpretation based on the notion of a knowledge
spectrum ranging from tacit to explicit. See, Leonard and Sensiper. The Role of Tacit
Knowledge in Group Innovation.
109 See Ambrosini and Bowman. Tacit Knowledge: Some Suggestions for Operationalisation;
Baumard. Tacit Knowledge in Organizations; Choo. The Knowing Organization; Haldin-
Herrgard. Difficulties in Diffusion of Tacit Knowledge in Organizations; Herschel, Nemati,
and Steiger. Tacit to Explicit Knowledge Conversion: Knowledge Exchange Protocols;
]ankowicz. Why Does Subjectivity Make Us Nervous? Making the Tacit Explicit; Kim, DH.
1993. The Link between Individual and Organisational Learning, Sloan Management
Review/ Fall edition; Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company; Nonaka, I
and G Von Krogh. 2000. Enabling Knowledge Creation: How to Unlock the Mystery of Tacit
Knowledge and Release the Power of Innovation. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Schariq.
How Does Knowledge Transform as It Is Transferred? Speculations on the Possibility of a
Cognitive Theory of Knowledge Landscapes; Smith. The Role of Tacit and Explicit
Knowledge in the Workplace; Spender. Competitive Advantage from Tacit Knowledge?
Unpacking the Concept and lts Strategic Implications.
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Ikujiro Nonaka'!" and the knowledge management theorists influenced by his
views,'!' these differences will be outlined in more detail. In preparation for such a
comparison it is necessary to also consider the wider philosophical implications of
Polanyi's claims about the basic structure of knowledge. These implications centre on
the relationship between knowledge, language and the paradigm of indwelling.
2.7 KNOWLEDGE, LANGUAGE AND THE PARADIGM OF
INDWELLING
Later, when the reception of the concept of tacit knowledge in knowledge
management theory is reviewed, it will be argued that the mainstream knowledge
management theories assume a commonsense view of language as a simple symbolic
representation of knowledge.l" Stating it bluntly (since this point will be argued fully
later) - much of knowledge management theory assumes that knowledge is
somehow situated in the head of an individual and that some of that knowledge can
then be articulated by means of language and thus transferred between individuals.
This is implied in their emphasis on the explication (articulation) of the content of
some knowledge in an individuals head, freezing that knowledge content in symbols
so to speak, to then enable the transfer of that content from one individual to others.
Such a model implies a number of assumptions regarding the difference between
knowledge and information, language and the knowledge of language, as well as the
basic model of communication between minds. These assumptions will be discussed
chapters three and four, but the concern lies with Polanyi for the moment. It is
impossible to graft the knowledge-transfer framework onto Polanyi's notion of tacit
integration and the paradigm of indwelling. In terms of Polanyi, knowledge is not so
110 Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company; Nonaka and Von Krogh. Enabling
Knowledge Creation
111 Ambrosini and Bowman. Tacit Knowledge: Some Suggestions for Operationalisation;
Baumard. Tacit Knowledge in Organizations; Leonard and Sensiper. The Role of Tacit
Knowledge in Group Innovation; Spender. Competitive Advantage from Tacit
Knowledge? Unpacking the Concept and Its Strategic Implications.
112 This assessment is made and argued fully by Ralph Stacey. See Stacey. Complex Responsive
Processes in Organization: 13-39.
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much the content of knowing, as it is the result of integrating awareness. The
structure of tacit knowing (the from-to relation between focal and background
awareness) shapes this content, which cannot exist independently from that which
integrates it. Thus it makes little sense to distinguish between knowledge (as
independent content) and knowing (as an act). In Polanyi's mind there is no such
separation, since meaning is produced by the act of integrating the background
particulars into the focal whole. Therefore straightforward point to grasp is that
viewing the articulation of knowledge content as the explication of tacit knowledge,
is dearly incompatible with the notion of tacit integration as the logical structure
underlying all forms of knowing.
An attempt to build a philosophy of language on the structure of tacit integration
would deal with the problem of the sign by denying any intrinsic associative link
between the signifier and the signified. This is of course nowhere near noteworthy in
post-Saussurian language philosophy, but it will help to illustrate the scope of the
logical structure of tacit integration as put forward by Polanyi. Take the simple
example of using a word (signifier) to designate an object (signified). Polanyi would
agree with non-essentialist language philosophers that the "word and its object are
not equal partners in an association."113In other words, the meaning of a word is not
its association with the object that it names. "The word in use has in fact no interest in
itself, as an object; in this it is very different from the object it names, which is
interesting in itself as an object."114Most language philosophers that similarly
divorces the meaning of the signifier from the signified, then solves the problem of
meaning by referring to the relation between the signifiers in a system of language,
often combining it with the practice of applying signifiers to that which is signified.
Polanyi makes a similar move:
113 Polanyiand Prosch.Meaning: 69.
114 Polanyiand Prosch.Meaning: 69.
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Our knowledge of the things denoted by words will have been largely
acquired by experience, in the same way, while the words will have
acquired their meaning by previously designating such an
experience .... Therefore when I receive information by reading a letter
and when I ponder the message of the letter, I am subsidiarily aware
not only of its text, but also of all the past occasions by which I have
come to understand the words of the text, and the whole range of this
subsidiary awareness is presented focally in terms of the message.!"
Polanyi contends that the meaning of a word also displays a from-to relation -like all
forms of tacit integration.t" A word thus has meaning only because it "bears on
something else which is its meaning."117 Words point subsidiarily to the focal
integration which is their meaning. Language then acts in the same way as maps,
mathematical formulas, and so forth as subsidiaries bearing upon their focal
meaning. liS The meaning in language is found in a "focal comprehension of all the
relevant instrumentally known particulars, just as the purpose of an action resides in
the co-ordinated innervation of its instrumentally used particulars."!"
When it comes to articulation, Polanyi distinguishes between the ineffable domain,
the co-extensive domain and the domain of sophistication.P" The ineffable domain
refers to that area of our experience that cannot be articulated at all, where both
knowledge and thought are predominantly tacit. This marks the limits to what can be
articulated or expressed. These limits has to do with either the inability to tell the
particulars apart (as in the case of riding a bicycle), or the inability to integrate the
115 Polanyi. Personal Knowledge: 92.
116 Polanyi. Personal Knowledge: 100-02;Polanyi and Prosch. Meaning: 70.
117 Polanyi and Prosch. Meaning: 69.
118 Polanyi and Prosch. Meaning: 70. Of course this section only considers Polanyi's view of
denotative language - the relation between the signifier and the signified. Metaphorical
language is a different matter altogether. In the case of a metaphor both the subisidiary
and the focal are of intrinsic interest, which complicates the relation of 'bearing upon.' See
Polanyi and Prosch. Meaning: 72-81.
119 Polanyi. Personal Knowledge: 92.
120 Polanyi. Personal Knowledge: 87.
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recognisable particulars into a whole (as in the case of the topography of the organs
inside the human body).
In the second domain, tacit is co-extensive with the text of which it carries the
meaning. Here the tacit component, upon which our awareness is focussed, is the
meaning of the information conveyed by speech of which we are subsidiarily aware.
The last domain is the area where articulation actually "encumbers the tacit work of
thought", or it refers to situations that "outrun our understanding and thus
anticipates novel modes of thought."121 Inboth these cases one's tacit understanding
does not resonate with the attempt to put it into words. Either one's concepts have to
be sharpened or modified to fit the phenomenon on which it bears, or the
phenomenon has to be reinterpreted in terms of the text.122
Here one finds another limit on articulation, namely that it is impossible to determine
beforehand the scope of a word or the combination of words, since the scope of
language is by nature indeterminate.Pê
Much less can we control in advance the myriads of arrangements in
which nouns, adjectives, verbs, and adverbs can be meaningfully
combined to form new affirmations or questions, thus
developing .... the meaning of the words themselves ever further in
these new contexts.P'
This indeterminacy built into articulation, leads Polanyi to argue that not only do we
know more than we can tell, but also that "we can never quite know what is implied
in what we say."125
The extension of the above is that in Polanyi's view language is not merely the
process of linguistic or symbolic representation of thought, language is also the
121Polanyi. Personal Knowledge: 87.
122Polanyi. Personal Knowledge: 95.
123Polanyi. Personal Knowledge: 94.
124Polanyi. Personal Knowledge: 94.
125Polanyi. Personal Knowledge: 95.
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"operation of symbols to assist in the process of thought."126Polanyi views language
itself as a tool. And like all other tools language is itself dependent on the powers of
tacit integration for successful performance. Thus the notion of tacit participates in
the process of articulation. Viewing articulation then as a process of explicating the
tacit, is to underestimate the function of tacit integration.
The notion of knowledge transfer between a sender and a receiver goes contrary to
Polanyi's notion of tacit integration requiring an act of knowing. Information may
well be packaged, but meaning is never packaged with that information. Meaning
can only be produced at the moment of the act of integration. The meaning of a
message is formed by integrating all the relevant subsidiary particulars, the separate
words, the grammatical rules whereby they were ordered, the context, the receiver's
interpretative skills, the past experiences of the receiver relating to the message, and
so on - all these things are integrated to form the focal meaning of the message. Of
some of these subsidiaries the receiver might be conscious, others might be
unconscious, as we have seen above this difference is in itself not important; what is
important is that meaning is produced when all of these subsidiary aspects are
integrated into a whole. It therefore makes little sense in terms of Polanyi's
framework to speak of knowledge transfer when referring to the process of
communication. What would count as "explicit knowledge" in the mainstream
knowledge management view of things, is not transferred in Polanyi's framework, but
integrated from a multitude of tacit particulars.
Tacit integration does not only playa role in articulation itself, the benefit of language
is that it provides opportunities for reflexive interaction with the knowledge
produced by the act of tacit integration. Whereas mainstream knowledge
management theory sees the enabling of knowledge transfer as the main benefit
derived from articulation, one could plausibly claim that Polanyi thinks that the
power of articulation lies in the interplay between knowledge and language.
Language is a tool that gives human knowledge its recursive character.
126Polanyi. Personal Knowledge: 87.
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[E]very use of language to describe experience in a changing world
applies language to a somewhat unprecedented instance of its subject
matter, and thus somewhat modifies both the meaning of language
and the structure of our conceptual framework.t"
This process of interaction between knowledge and language continually updates
our interpretative frameworks. Our experience of the world is not merely assimilated
into a fixed interpretative framework, but our frameworks are also adapted to
include the lessons of our experience.w The lesson is of course that the fitter the
framework proves to be given any number of experiences, the more unthinkingly it is
used. In cases where the framework does not fit, it is tacitly updated, while the
person is focally aware of the novel situation that is at hand.
The adaptation of our conceptions and of the corresponding use of
language to new things that we identify as new variants of known
kinds of things is achieved subsidiarily, while our attention is
focussed on making sense of a situation in front of us. Thus we do this
in the same way in which we keep modifying, subsidiarily, our
interpretation of sensory clues by striving for clear and coherent
perceptions, or enlarging our skill without focally knowing how by
practicing them in ever new situations.P"
Language is constantly reinterpreted-in-use without the speakers of the language
being focally aware of these changes. Polanyi actually describes languages as the
product of "groping for words in the process of making new conceptual decisions, to
be conveyed by words."130 Different languages and dialects are then historically
bound alternatives sustaining different conceptual frameworks used for interpreting
the world.
127 Polanyi. Personal Knowledge: 104-05.
128 Polanyi. Personal Knowledge: 105.
129 Polanyi. Personal Knowledge: 112.
130 Polanyi. Personal Knowledge: 112.
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2.8 SUMMARY: THE ESSENCE OF THE ARGUMENT
CONCERNING TACIT INTEGRATION
We know from Gestalt that when perceiving something, we recognise it by its
borders and the difference between itself and the environment that forms its
background. Although one's attention is focussed on the object in question, the
perception against a background is made possible through one's reliance on a
multitude of clues and the relation between those clues. These clues form secondary
aspects that are part of the object, or that surround the object, and one does not focus
directly on them, but one does have awareness of them. Polanyi says that our
awareness of these secondary aspects is a subsidiary awareness, while our focal
awareness remains on the whole.!" One tacitly integrates the individual secondary
aspects into the comprehensive entity that they jointly form. Consequently Polanyi
argues that the interplay between the subsidiary and focal awareness makes
perception possible.
A feature of the argument is that one's subsidiary awareness is directed by the
integrating function of one's focal awareness. It is often impossible to specify the
particulars of which one is subsidiarily aware. In addition, the meaning of an object
lies in the coherence, and this leads Polanyi to identify the structure of all knowing as
a from-to relation; one attends from the subsidiary parts to the focal whole which is
the meaning of the parts.132 Consequently, shifting one's focal attention from the
whole to the parts destroys the comprehensive understanding.
131 Polanyi. Knowing and Being: 128,33-34,36; Polanyi. Tacit Knowing: Its Bearing on Some
Problems of Philosophy: 164-65; Polanyi. Logic of Tacit Inference: 140,42,44,48,51; Polanyi.
The Structure of Consciousness: 212-14,35,38; Polanyi. Sense-Giving and Sense-Reading:
182-84,93-95,98,204; Polanyi and Prosch. Meaning: 33-42,49,51,53-54,61,64,70,74-
75,80,91,180.
132 Polanyi. Logic of Tacit Inference: 140-41,45-48,51; Polanyi. The Structure of Consciousness:
214; Polanyi. Sense-Giving and Sense-Reading: 182,84-85,94; Polanyi and Prosch. Meaning:
34-42,48-49,51,54,59,61,70-72,74-76,97,98,137-38.
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This structure of perception can now be applied to other forms of knowing. In the
same way as one relies on the secondary aspects of an object when perceiving it as a
whole, one also relies on one's body when perceiving things outside it. One's body
cannot be experienced as a direct object. Instead one "experiences your own body in
terms of the world to which [you are] attending from [your] body."133Thus in every
act of perception one relies on your body as a subsidiary means for observing objects
that lie outside the body. This insight forms the basis for Polanyi's paradigm of
induieilingv« Just as one knows the external world by dwelling in your body,
comprehensive entities are known by dwelling in their particulars, or even when
handling tools (especially when expertly handled), they are treated as if they are
extensions of one's body. Thus indwelling is the way one participates in
comprehensive entities. Under these comprehensive entities count one's own body,
the things one perceives, the objects one handles, even the theories one employs to
understand the world and other people. In this sense one dwells in mathematical
theory and knows it in a way analogous to Polanyi's description of how we dwell in
our own bodies.
2.9 POLANYI'S CRITIQUE OF OBJECTIVISM IN
PHILOSOPHY
In conclusion the importance of the concept of tacit knowledge for Polanyi's overall
project - namely his critique of objectivism in philosophy - can be demonstrated.
The traditional epistemological strategy since Descartes (and onwards through Kant
and Popper) has been to strip one's critique of knowledge of all presuppositions.
Polanyi's criticism of this strategy involves the insight that all critique of knowledge
133 Polanyi and Prosch. Meaning: 36.
134 Polanyi. Personal Knowledge: 59; Polanyi. Knowing and Being: 134,36; Polanyi. Tacit
Knowing: Its Bearing on Some Problems of Philosophy: 160,62; Polanyi. Logic of Tacit
Inference: 148-49,51-52,56;Polanyi. The Structure of Consciousness: 214,20-21; Polanyi and
Prosch. Meaning: 37,45,54,61,138.
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(all epistemology) presupposes knowledge. Which he derives from his argument that
all explicit knowledge displays the same logical structure as tacit knowledge.
Polanyi expresses presupposed knowledge in terms of one's historical situatedness,
which is present as inherited background practices that cannot be explicitly
articulated in theoretical language. These background practices are so all
encompassing and fundamental that they cannot be made an object of analysis,
partly because these inherited practices involve embodied skills_135 The "rules" of
practice can only be transmitted by skilful practices that embody them. In other
words they are an instance of tacit knowledge. Polanyi uses the term "cultural
apprenticeship"136 to describe the transmission of the tradition of personal
knowledge. Thus objectifying (scientific) knowledge always refers back to some
previous relation of participation in epistemology or science.
The question now is to what extent objectifying knowledge can free itself from the
relation of participation that it refers to. Polanyi argues that total reflection is
impossible, because the background is logically unspecifiable. Note that to some
extent Polanyi, does not argue that presuppositions are logically inaccessible; they
hold that presuppositions are simply not accessible as a complete set. One could
conceivably explicate and analyse a single presupposition, but one cannot critically
assess all of one's presuppositions simultaneously. This is so because even reflection
on one's presuppositions has to take place in the context of presupposition. Of course
there is a point at which analysis has to fail, because the notion of tacit knowing
combines presuppositions and skills. In other words, cognitive skills and
presupposition are dimensions of the same whole that breaks down upon analysis.
Polanyi states:
135 Polanyi. Personal Knowledge: chapter 4.
136 Polanyi. Personal Knowledge: 53,374-79.
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The curious thing is that we have no clear knowledge of what our
presuppositions are and when we try to formulate them they appear
quite unconvincing ... I suggest now that the supposed
presuppositions of science are so futile because the actual foundation
of our scientific beliefs cannot be asserted at all. When we accept a
certain set of presuppositions and use them as our interpretative
framework, we may be said to dwell in them as we do in our own
body. Their uncritical acceptance for the time being consists in a
process of assimilation by which we identify ourselves with them.
They are not asserted and cannot be asserted, for assertion can be
made only within a framework with which we have identified
ourselves for the time being; as they are themselves our ultimate
framework, they are essentially inarticulable.P"
At this point it seems as if Polanyi opens himself to the charge of reckless cognitive
relativism, but closer inspection reveals that the paradigm of indwelling is Polanyi's
attempt to escape from the Cartesian split between subject and object, without
resorting to all out cognitive relativism. At best it is a part solution, because
indwelling constantly interiorises the objective. The dynamic relation between that
which is experienced proximal and that which is experienced distaL By interiorising
for instance an interpretative framework, the framework is no longer outside the self,
one is dwelling inside it. It is important to note that only through a form of
indwelling can an interpretative framework be used successfully. The framework
that has been thus sufficiently interiorised can then be used for further acts of
integration, continually giving meaning to events that lie outside the self. In this way
the interpretative frames that people use, whether it is a theory or a language or an
assumption about the world, are connected to the construction of the self. Polanyi's
paradigm of indwelling views the construction of the self also as the construction of
reality.
137 Polanyi. Personal Knowledge: 59-60.
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On the whole the concept of tacit knowledge enables Polanyi to argue against
Objectivism that scientific discovery cannot be properly explained through explicit
inference alone. It seems that the concept of tacit knowledge functions in Polanyi's
philosophy in much the same way as, for example, the concept of "paradigm"
functions in Kuhn, "inherited background" in Wittgenstein, or "pre-understanding"
and "tradition" in Gadamer's theories.l"
138 Turner, S. 1994. The Social Theory of Practices: Tradition, Tacit Knowledge and Presupposition. London: Polity
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Chapter Three
IKUJIRO NONAKA:
KNOWLEDGE CREATION AND
KNOWLEDGE PROCESSING
The key to knowledge creation lies in the mobilization and conversion of tacit
knowledge.
Ikujiro Nonaka & Hirotaka Takeuchi, "Knowledge Creating
Company."
1.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter focuses on Nonaka's theory of organisational knowledge creation and
the explanatory function of the concept of tacit knowledge in this theory. Nonaka is a
central figure, because a number of knowledge management theorists claim to base
their theories on his modification of Polanyi's epistemology.w In the secondary
discourse considering Nonaka's epistemological contribution to knowledge
management, his theory is positioned as if it was intended to be a knowledge
management theory.w' Whilst Nonaka has been enormously influential in a certain
139 Amongst others: Baumard. Tacit Knowledge in Organizations; Leonard and Sensiper. The
Role of Tacit Knowledge in Group Innovation; Spender. Competitive Advantage from
Tacit Knowledge? Unpacking the Concept and lts Strategic Implications; Weggeman, M.
1997. Kennismanagement: Inrichting En Besturing Van Kennisintensieve Organisaties.
Schiedam: Scriptum
140 Lubit. Tacit Knowledge and Knowledge Management: The Keys to Sustainable
Competitive Advantage; Schreinemakers and Essers. Nonaka's Subjectivist Conception of
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phase of knowledge management theory-building.t" his work is probably best
understood by interpreting it as the management application of research on the
nature of dynamic firm capabilities.
Considering Nonaka's theory as the extension of theories on dynamic firm
capabilities highlights the academic route along which the concept of tacit knowledge
travelled from Polanyi to Nonaka. Therefore, in the argument here, Nonaka is
positioned as the link between organisation theory applications of the concept of tacit
knowledge and a particular school of knowledge management theorising, which also
makes use of the concept of tacit knowledge. Therefore, this chapter consists of two
sections.
The first section fills the gap between Nonaka and Polanyi by showing how the
concept of tacit knowledge made its way through the resource-based theory of the
firm, evolutionary economics, and dynamic firm capabilities, to find a place in
Nonaka's theory of organisational knowledge creation. The aim in this section is to
provide an outline of a conceptual history.
The second section describes and analyses Nonaka's theory and shows the
explanatory function of the concept of tacit knowledge. Tracing the route that the
concept followed from Polanyi through organisation theory to Nonaka, provides the
background for conjecture on how the differences of theoretical function of the
concept of tacit knowledge (between Nonaka and Polanyi) carne about.
Knowledge in Corporate Knowledge Management; Tsoukas. Do We Really Understand
Tacit Knowledge? ; Whitley and Hedesstrom. What Is Meant by Tacit Knowledge?
141 Stacey. Complex Responsive Processes in Organization: 13.
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ORGANISATIONAL ROUTINES
1.2 NELSON AND WINTER:TACITKNOWLEDGE AND
Nonaka and Takeuchi attempted to develop a "dynamic theory of organisational
knowledge creation."142This emphasis on 'dynamics' establishes a link of sorts with
the dynamic firm capabilities approach. The nature of this link will be elaborated in
the following section. It also shows that Nonaka shares the assumption of
evolutionary economists that dynamics is a methodological imperative.l" In short, a
dynamics approach holds that the explanation of phenomena is intimately tied to
how those phenomena came into being.
It is well-known that Nelson and Winter's Evolutionary Theory of Economic Changev«
introduced Polanyi's concept of tacit knowledge to organisation theory.i" However,
Nonaka and Takeuchi inexplicably fails to note this fact in their central work, The
Knowledge Creating Company, and in there only refer to Nelson and Winter's theory as
part of a general discussion on the epistemology of organisation and management
studies.t= the outcome of which is to conclude that "[t]he subjective, bodily, and tacit
aspects of knowledge are still largely neglected."147Yet, there are clear indications
that Nonaka's thought can be understood as building on Nelson and Winter, such as
Nonaka's earlier book on the theory of the firm whose translated title - The Theory of
Corporate Evolution - echoes the title and concerns of Nelson and Winter's seminal
142Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: chapter 3.
143Dosi, G and B Coriat. 1998.The Institutional Embeddedness of Economic Change: An
Appraisal of the 'Evolutionary' and 'Regulationist' Research Programmes, in Nielsen, K
and B Johnson (eds.), Institutions and Economic Change: New Perspectives on Markets, Firms
and Technology. London: Edward Elgar: 4.
144 Nelson and Winter. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change
145A special issue of Industrial and Corporate Change considers the impact of Nelson and
Winter's An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change and their contribution to the nature of
technological and organisational knowledge is reviewed in papers by Foss, Nightingale,
Foray and Steinmuller. See, Industrial and Corporate Change, Volume 12, No 2 (2003).
146Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 34.
147Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 49.
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work.>" Later articles by Nonaka do refer to Nelson and Winter in the context of the
phenomenon of tacit knowledge.r" It is also in these later articles where Nonaka
consciously positions his own theory as an extension of the dynamic capabilities
approach to firms:
Teece et.al, term such capability 'dynamic capability', i.e. a firm's
ability to use existing firm-specific capabilities and to develop new
ones. Dynamic capability provides a firm with the basis for its
sustainable advantage over time The theory of the knowledge-
creating firm needs to deal with such dynamic capability. The
dynamic capability to create new knowledge out of existing
knowledge can be accumulated only through .... actually engaging in
organisational knowledge-creating activities.l'"
Writers using the dynamic firm capabilities approach in tum openly claim that their
approach is an extension of the resource-based view of the firm and specifically
Nelson and Winter's research on firm capability. Teece writes: "We refer to this as the
'dynamic capabilities' approach .... Elements of the approach can be found in
Schumpeter (1942), Pemose (1959), Nelson and Winter (1982)... "151 It is therefore fair
to assume that Polanyi's concept of tacit knowledge found its way into Nonaka's
theory by way of the work of Nelson and Winter (evolutionary economics) and the
148 Nonaka, I.1985.Kigyo Sinka Ron (the Theory of Corporate Evolution). Tokyo: Nikkei
Shinbunsya See citation in, Nonaka, I and R Toyama. 2002. A Firm as a Dialectical Being:
Towards a Dynamic Theory of a Firm, Industrial and Corporate Change 11/5; Nonaka, I, R
Toyama, and P Byesiere. 2001. A Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation:
Understanding the Dynamic Process of Creating Knowledge, in Dierkes, M, et al. (eds.),
Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge: 491-517. Oxford: Oxford University
Press
149 Nonaka and Toyama. A Firm as a Dialectical Being: 1003;Nonaka, I, R Toyama, and A
Nagata. 2000. A Firm as a Knowledge-Creating Entity: A New Perspective on the Theory
of the Firm, Industrial and Corporate Change 9/1: 5,7.
150 Nonaka, Toyama, and Nagata. A Firm as a Knowledge-Creating Entity: 7.
151 Teece, D and A Shuen. 1997.Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management, Strategic
Management Journal18: 510. See also, Eisenhardt, KM and JA Martin. 2000. Dynamic
Capabilities: What Are They?, Strategic Management Journal21: 1114.
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1.2.1 RESOURCE-BASED AND EVOLUTIONARY THEORIES OF THE FIRM
dynamic capabilities approach to explaining innovation in firms. Hence Nonaka's
theory is interpreted in this light and not only as a knowledge management theory.
Resource-based approach to organisations argue that in an uncertain environment
the only sustainable sources of competitive advantage are unique and difficult to
imitate resources.r? The fundamental resource of this type is a collection of
technology, operating procedures and knowledge that is focussed on the
organisation's primary reason for existence - these are collectively called 'core
competencies.'153 Core competencies are difficult to develop quickly and are probably
harder to buy in, because the skills and knowledge that these competencies consist of
are difficult to specify and often embodied in social routines. In other words, core
competencies are tacit and distributed. Therefore, the phenomenon of tacit knowledge is
clearly a consideration in the resource-based theory of the firm, but the concept of tacit
knowledge (and with it Polanyi's epistemology) was not appropriated to the same
extent as in knowledge management theory. The resource-based literature seem to
prefer the concept "sticky knowledge" to the concept of tacit knowledge.154155
152Strategic management literature since the early 1990's tends to advocate a resource-based
approach to strategy, but much of resource-based theory was already developed in the
1950's. See, Penrose, ET. 1959. The Theory of the Growth of the Firm. New York NY: Wiley
153The primary works on this would be Hamel, G and CK Prahalad. 1990. The Core
Competence of the Corporation, Harvard Business Review 68. and Leonard-Barton, D. 1992.
Core Capabilities and Core Rigidities: A Paradox in Managing New Product Development,
Strategic Management Journal13; Leonard-Barton, D. 1995.Wellsprings of Knowledge. Boston
MA: Harvard Business School Press
154 For a study on "stickiness" of organisational knowledge, refer to Liebeskind, JP. 1996.
Knowledge, Strategy, and the Theory of the Firm, Strategic Management Journal17J Winter
Special Issue; Szulanski, G. 1996. Exploring Internal Stickiness: Impediments to the
Transfer of Best Practice within the Firm, Strategic Management Journal17.
155One can speculate on the reasons why Polanyi's epistemology has not caught on in
strategy literature to the same extent as in knowledge management literature. An article by
Liebeskind on the institutional capabilities that renders knowledge sticky and offers better
protection than markets, could imply that resource-based theory is the extension of
transaction cost theory and thus operates with an orthodox view of organisations not
really compatible with Polanyi's epistemology. See, Liebeskind. Knowledge, Strategy, and
the Theory of the Firm.
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By contrast Polanyi's epistemology lies beneath a related approach to organisations,
namely the evolutionary theory of the firm. This is because the foundation of this
approach to organisations, is the work of Nelson and Winter who directly based their
approach on Polanyi.l= Their analysis of skilful and/or routinised behaviour derive
directly from Polanyi's argument that tacit knowledge displays the same structure as
skills:
[I]n Polanyi's Personal knowledge, the discussion of skills plays a role
analogous to our own discussion here. Itprovides a useful perspective
on other realms of knowledge - in his case, that of scientific
knowledge; in ours, that of organisational capability.t"
Tacit knowledge is used in Nelson and Winter's theory as the hinge-point for a
critique of neoclassical economics. In line with Herbert Simon's information
processing paradigm, orthodox theories explain firm behaviour in terms of choice
optimisation within the parameters of certain objectives.l" Evolutionary economists
find that these assumptions constitute an abstraction that hampers the analysis of
innovation. "The reduction of rationality to maximization makes it possible for the
neoclassical economist to ignore the psychological and cognitive aspects of decision-
making."159
Nelson and Winter tried to adapt Herbert Simon's theory of decision-making with
the help of Polanyi's epistemological distinction between tacit and explicit
knowledge.v' They tried to highlight the importance of 'doing' (tacit skills) alongside
156 Nelson and Winter. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change: 76.
157Nelson and Winter. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change: 76.
158Nelson and Winter. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change: chapter 3.
159Dosi, G and LMarengo. 1994. Some Elements of an Evolutionary Theory of Organizational
Competences, in England, RW (ed.), Evolutionary Concepts in Contemporary Economics.
Michigan: University of Michigan Press: 167.
160 Foss, NJ. 2003. Bounded Rationality and Tacit Knowledge in the Organizational
Capabilities Approach: An Assessment and a Re-Evaluation, Industrial and Corporate
Change 12/2; Nightingale, P. 2003. If Nelson and Winter Are Only Half Right About Tacit
Knowledge, Which Half? A Searlian Critique of 'Codification', Industrial and Corporate
Change 12/ 2.
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'deciding.' Herbert Simon views organisational routines, like standard operating
procedures for example, as a bounded rationality mechanism to simplify the
decision-making procedure.l" Nelson and Winter, on the other hand, view
organisational routines as repositories of organisational knowledge, know-how and
skill. To them routines are simply patterns of interactions in response to problems
encountered in the environment.t= Both familiar and unfamiliar problems can only
be responded to in terms of interactions that are already scripted in the organisation
or for which a capacity already exists. In this sense organisations respond to their
environment analogous to the way in which biological organisms do. This is why
they call their theory an evolutionary theory.
Those organisational routines that are so effective that they are taken for granted are
invariably social and tacit in nature. This perspective on organisational capability
leads them to conclude that central aspects of human knowledge cannot (and indeed
should not) be explicitly formulated. Consequently, neoclassical economists are
mistaken in making these a basis for optimisation. Nelson and Winter use an analysis
of the nature of skilful and/or routinised behaviour to criticise the orthodox view of
individual and firm behaviour on the basis of the shortcomings of the notion of
choice optimisation:
[O]rthodoxy treats skilful behaviour ... as maximizing choice, and
"choice" carries connotations of "deliberation". We, on the other
hand, emphasize the automaticity of skilful behaviour and the
suppression of choice it involves.w
It is clear that the advantages of skill are related to the suppression of deliberate
choice, which confines behaviour to well-defined contexts and thus reduces option
161 Foss. Bounded Rationality and Tacit Knowledge in the Organizational Capabilities
Approach: An Assessment and aRe-Evaluation: 191.
162 Nelson and Winter. An Evolutionary Theon) of Economic Change: 74-76.
163 Nelson and Winter. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change: 94.
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selection.v- This echoes Polanyi's examples citing the destructive effect of focussing
attention to the particulars rather than the comprehensive entity.
Instead of looking towards choice optimisation, Nelson and Winter, and other
evolutionary economists, argue that innovation and the speed and direction of
technical change can be much better understood in terms of an evolutionary learning
process that is path-dependent. Innovation in a technological context is primarily
seen as problem solving. The knowledge base in high-technology sectors is linked to
the more tacit and specific knowledge of the innovative units of scientists who are at
the forefront of developments in the field.t= Moreover, in the knowledge base of
"each technology there are elements of tacit and specific knowledge that are not and
cannot be written down in a 'blueprint' form, and cannot, therefore be entirely
diffused either in the form of public or proprietary information."166 Therefore, this
path dependency can once again be understood in terms of a tacit background that
forms part of the initial state from which new states unfold.
1.2.2 DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES
The dynamic firm capabilities approach refined Nelson and Winter's insight
regarding the importance of firm capabilities by introducing a distinction between
static and dynamic routines.v" Routines are constantly updated, but as long as
situations remain relatively familiar, organisations only have to replicate interactions
as a response to the situation. These routines are static and clearly cannot be the
source of innovation. In contrast, dynamic routines are patterns of interaction that
164 Nelson and Winter. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change: 85.
165 Dosi, G. 1988. Sources, Procedures, and Microeconomic Effects of Innovation, Journal of
Economic Literature 26/ 3: 69.
166 Dosi. Sources, Procedures, and Microeconomic Effects of Innovation: 74.
167 Eisenhardt and Martin. Dynamic Capabilities: What Are They; Mathews, JA. 2003.
Competitive Dynamics and Economic Learning: An Extended Resource-Based View,
Industrial and Corporate Change 12/ 1;Teece and Shuen. Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic
Management.
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involve experimentation and coordination, reconfiguration and integration of
internal processes.t=
It could be said that the insight of evolutionary economics regarding the
development of strategically relevant organisational competencies combined with
Schumpeter's notion of 'creative destruction,' would be roughly representative of the
basic commitments of the dynamic capabilities approach to organisational
innovation.w The dynamic capabilities approach does not view innovation as
sophisticated problem-solving, but rather views innovation as the result of a
continual internal reconfiguration of organisational capabilities.F" Whereas the
resource-based approach emphasised the competitive advantage derived from firrn-
specific capabilities, the dynamic capabilities approach tries to account for the actual
processes by which organisations acquire and continually reconfigure their
competencies. Consequently, and not surprisingly, the most important set of
organisational capabilities are those that concern the development of new
knowledge, usually in the form of organisational processes and products. In other
words, dynamic capabilities are those capabilities connected to knowledge creation
and the transformational potential that new knowledge holds for an organisation.'?'
With the organisational information processing view as basic assumption,
information management was largely conceived of as the logistic support for
organisational information processing. All forms of information organisation,
whether a filing protocol or standard operating procedures connected to selected
types of information, were aimed at controlling and enhancing diffusion and access
to information.!" Nonaka's theory stabs at this fundamental information processing
assumption, because it emphasises the problem of new knowledge rather than the
168 Eisenhardt and Martin. Dynamic Capabilities: What Are They?: 1107.
169 Teece and Shu en. Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management: 510.
170 Teece and. Shuen. Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management: 515,16.
171 Teece and Shuen. Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management: 515.
172 The initial effect of the new information and communication technologies was to enhance
the logistic function of information management. The amount and type of information that
could be stored, manipulated and remotely accessed was massively increased.
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processing of already existing knowledge.v" Nonaka argues that more than just
processing information from the environment, an organisation interacts with its
environment.v- This dynamic process of interaction continually reshapes both the
organisation and its environment (through the process of knowledge creation).
Equally, more than mechanically responding to and solving problems as they arise,
the issue of innovation becomes a question regarding the framing of problems and
how organisations generate the new knowledge to solve those problems. A
knowledge processing view of the organisation assumes already existing knowledge
and thus focuses on the body of knowledge already available to the organisation.?"
Thus the knowledge processing view of the organisation cannot account for the
creation of new knowledge; something the organisational capabilities approach seeks
to correct. Thus, the dynamic capabilities insight that the ability to create and use
knowledge is one of the most important sources of an organisation's competitive
advantage, is the starting point of Nonaka's argument that individual tacit
knowledge is the key to organisational learning. His theory of organisational
knowledge creation outlines how individual learning is transformed into group
knowledge and finally into organisational knowledge.
It is therefore clear that Nonaka's theory stands in a tradition that is primarily
concerned with the problem of innovation as knowledge creation. It is also notable
that the central authors in the case of evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter)
and in the case of dynamic firm capabilities (Teece) looked toward the concept of
tacit knowledge to modify the information processing paradigm sufficiently to
account for innovation.
From the above it seems reasonable to assume that Nonaka's use of the concept tacit
knowledge is born from the need to explain the problem of innovation, namely the
origin of new knowledge. Yet, most of the authors in early knowledge management
173 Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 49-50.
174 Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 56.
175 Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 49.
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theory seem to appropriate Nonaka's modification of Polanyi's concept of tacit
knowledge as a term designating knowledge content that cannot be communicated
as information. As a result an explanation is needed for how it came about that
Nonaka's theory of innovation became the basis for various theories of knowledge
dissemination during a particular stage of knowledge management theorising.
The next section will unpack the various elements of Nonaka's theory. It will be
shown that the central element in Nonaka's theory implies two different
arguments.vs The primary argument is that management practices should provide
the enabling conditions for the tacit realm to thrive, since that is the only source of
new knowledge. The secondary argument relates to the fact that innovative
organisations are those that succeed in turning the tacit knowledge of its members
into tangible products (and thus explicit knowledge). This secondary argument
places a premium on the conversion of tacit into explicit knowledge. Hence the
emphasis moves from generating new knowledge (innovation) to codifying and
diffusing existing knowledge (logistics). This analysis is then offered as an
explanation as to why Nonaka's theory of knowledge creation, became the basis for
various theories of knowledge management.
1.3 APPROACHING NONAKA
Nonaka's theory was restated a number of times since it was published in its original
form in Japanese in 1990.177 178 These modifications were mostly the reconfiguration of
176 Retrospectively one can speculate that the germ of this contradiction is already present in
the work of Nelson and Winter as the result of their attempt to graft Polanyi's
epistemology onto Simon's information processing paradigm. All theories taking Nelson
and Winter as starting point run the risk of this internal tension. Paul Nightingale has for
instance noted that "the tensions that have followed Nelson and Winter's attempt to bring
these two traditions together are consequences of the fact that Polanyi and Simon are
incompatible because what they regard as 'real,' and consequently the nature of their
explanations, is fundamentally different." See, Nightingale. If Nelson and Winter Are Only
Half Right About Tacit Knowledge, Which Half?: 150.
177 Nonaka.L 1990. Chishiki-Souzou No Keiei (A Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation).
Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun-sha. Naturally I could not consult this work since it is only
available in Japanese, but I assume from the abstract that it was the first statement of
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spiral driving these conversions.l'"
components that reappear in later versions of the theory as more or less complete
units. The major components are the following:
• A distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge.?" derived from Polanyi.
• Four modes of knowledge conversion between tacit and explicit knowledge,
forming the SECI-model (after each of the four modes) and the knowledge
• A description of the process of organisational knowledge creation, consisting
of five phases.!"
• A set of enabling conditions that facilitate the knowledge conversion tand
hence contribute to the organisational knowledge creation process.l'"
• "Ba" (the context or space of knowledge conversion) - a later addition to the
theory, which is interpreted as a response to critics.i=
Nonaka's theory of organisational knowledge creation. This theory was first published in
English a year later as: Nonaka, I. 1991. The Knowledge-Creating Company, Harvard
Business Review/ Nov-Dec.
178 I consulted no less than seven publications in which Nonaka states his theory in some or
other form. See, Nonaka. The Knowledge-Creating Company; Nonaka, I. 1994. A Dynamic
Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation, Organization Science 5/ 1; Nonaka, I and N
Konno. 1998. The Concept of "Ba":Building a Foundation for Knowledge Creation,
California Management Review 40/ 3; Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating
Company; Nonaka and Toyama. A Firm as a Dialectical Being; Nonaka, Toyama, and
Nagata. A Firm as a Knowledge-Creating Entity; Nonaka and Von Krogh. Enabling
Knowledge Creation
179 Nonaka and Konno. The Concept of "Ba":42; Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-
Creating Company: 56-61.
180 Nonaka and Konno. The Concept of "Ba":42-45; Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-
Creating Company: 62-73;Nonaka and Toyama. A Firm as a Dialectical Being: 996-98;
Nonaka, Toyama, and Byesiere. A Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation: 494-98;
Nonaka, Toyama, and Nagata. A Firm as a Knowledge-Creating Entity: 10-11.
181 Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 83-89.
182 Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 73-83; Nonaka, Toyama, and
Byosiere. A Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation: 508-11.
183 Nonaka and Konno. The Concept of "Ba";Nonaka and Toyama. A Firm as a Dialectical
Being: 1001-03;Nonaka, Toyama, and Byosiere. A Theory of Organizational Knowledge
Creation: 498-501;Nonaka, Toyama, and Nagata. A Firm as a Knowledge-Creating Entity:
8-9.
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• A management style that is conducive to the process of organisational
knowledge creation, called middle-up-down management style. 184
• An organisational structure'» that corresponds with the management style,
called the hypertext organisational structure.
Reconfiguration of components notwithstanding, the backbone of the theory remains
the SECI-model and its accompanying spiral of continuous knowledge conversions
from tacit to explicit knowledge and back again. In this chapter the SECI-model will
be the main focus. What will be left aside are the management style and
organisational structure components as they are derivatives of the SECI-model and
not directly concerned with tacit knowledge.
184 Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: chapter 5; Nonaka, Toyama, and
Byesiere. A Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation: 503-08.
185 Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: chapter 6; Nonaka, Toyama, and
Byosiëre. A Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation: 511-13.
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Summary of Nonaka's theory showing its different components and how they relate to each other:
5 phases of SEC I-modes of "Ba" Enabling Conditions
knowledge creation knowledge conversion (platforms/context for (facilitating the phases of the process and
knowledge creation) the modes of interaction)
Requisite variety of team members; redundancy of
Socialization Originating Ba information; interpretation of organisational intention;Sharing tacit knowledge (tacit-tacit) (face-to-face interaction) management injects creative chaos by settingchallenging goals and endows team members with
autonomy.
Autonomy helps team members to diverge their thinking
freely; intention ensures focus and convergent thinking;
Creating Concepts Externalization Dialoguing Ba requisite variety provides different perspectives;(tacit-explicit) (peer-to-peer interaction) fluctuation & chaos challenges established ways of
thinking; redundancy of information aids understanding
of figurative language.
Justification criteria reflected in the organisational
Justifying Concepts www www intention; the process is facilitated by redundancy of
information about the intention.
Building an Archetype Combination
Systemizing Ba Requisite variety and redundancy facilitate this process;
(explicit-explicit) (group-to-group interaction) intention converge various know-hows.
Internalization Exercising Ba
Autonomy enable units to apply knowledge developed
Cross-levelling of Knowledge elsewhere; fluctuation, redundancy and requisite variety(explicit-tacit) (on-site interaction) internal to these units, facilitate the knowledge transfer.
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Nonaka takes organisational practice and an organisation's worldview to be rooted
in the subjective and tacit convictions, commitments and values of the members of
the organisation.w As a result, all new ideas originate in these tacit commitments. In
this sense, tacit knowledge is the wellspring of innovation and creativity.
The insight that new knowledge germinates in the unstructured subjective domain
means that managerial control over the information flow could be detrimental to the
knowledge creation process. It follows that management should be concerned with
the provision and maintenance of conditions that are conducive to the elicitation of
such tacit knowledge.
As a result Nonaka's theory incorporates a section on the "enabling conditions" that
are necessary conditions for the knowledge spiral to take place. On the basis of these
enabling conditions, an appropriate management style and a corresponding
organisational structure is then outlined.
However, developing these new ideas into prototypes and eventually into products
requires constant interaction between individuals, groups and eventually
organisations. Nonaka's dynamic theory welds this process of interaction with the
notion of tacit knowledge as a subjective resource, and argues that this process of
interaction can and should be actively managed.
186 Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 58.
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As we have stated repeatedly, an organisation cannot create
knowledge by itself. Since tacit knowledge held by individuals is the
basis of organisational knowledge creation, it seems natural to start
the process by focussing on tacit knowledge, which is the rich,
untapped source of new knowledge. But tacit knowledge cannot be
communicated or passed onto others easily, since it is acquired
primarily through experience and not easily expressed in words.
Thus, the sharing of tacit knowledge among individuals with different
backgrounds, perspectives, and motivations becomes the critical step
for organisational learning to take place.t"
The quoted paragraph reveals firstly that it is individuals who create knowledge,
secondly that tacit and explicit knowledge are two distinguishable phenomena,
thirdly that tacit knowledge can be converted into explicit knowledge, fourthly that,
once converted, explicit knowledge is easier to communicate than tacit knowledge.
The linchpin of the theory is therefore the SECI-model outlining the various modes of
interaction between these two kinds of knowledge, showing how the conversion
from tacit to explicit and back again takes place, and accounting for the movement
from the individual to the organisational knowledge level.
1.4 SECI MODEL OF KNOWLEDGE CONVERSION AND
THE KNOWLEDGE SPIRAL
Nonaka's introduction of a spiral model of continuous knowledge conversion that
describes the process of interaction between tacit and explicit knowledge goes
beyond Polanyi's distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge. In the words of
Tsoukas, Polanyi's conceptualisation of tacit and explicit is as flipsides, whilst in the
mind of Nonaka they are opposites. ISS In the spiral model the process of interaction
187 Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 85.
188 Tsoukas. Do We Really Understand Tacit Knowledge?
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leads to a continuous cycle of conversion of tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge
and back again. Quite clearly this notion of continuous conversion does not correlate
with Polanyi's view that the tacit dimension is logically unspecifiable. In Nonaka's
model we are dealing with the interaction between two different kinds of knowledge
content, tacit and explicit. This interaction takes place in the form of a knowledge
spiral involving four modes of knowledge conversion - each of which is associated
with a specific type of interaction.
1.4.1 SOCIALISATION
Socialisation is a mode in which tacit interacts with tacit. This is "a process of sharing
experiences and thereby creating tacit knowledge such as shared mental models and
technical skills."189Socialisation is, therefore, a process in which tacit knowledge is
experientially acquired directly from someone else's tacit knowledge. Learning takes
place not through language, but through imitation and observation.t?" Essentially
socialisation takes place during joint activities when participants share the same
experience. The result of sharing the same experience is that participants forge a
shared mental model and foster mutual trust.'?'
The importance of this mode of interaction to Nonaka's theory is not immediately
apparent, but any explanation of social behaviour that appeals to a phenomenon
such as tacit knowledge, must also provide a theory of how this tacit knowledge is
transmitted as tacit knowledge. Without such an explanation the phenomenon of tacit
knowledge loses its usefulness as an explanation for human behaviour, because if all
knowledge has to be extemalised before it can be transmitted at all, then one could
adequately explain the phenomenon without resorting to the concept of tacit
knowledge at all. It is therefore important to Nonaka's methodological assumption
about the importance of the phenomenon of tacit knowledge that some form of tacit
transmission of tacit knowledge is at least possible, even though it has limitations as a
transmission mode.
189 Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 62.
190 Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 62-63.
191 Nonaka, Toyama, and Byosiëre. A Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation: 495.
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1.4.2 E:XTERNALISAnON
Externalisation concerns "the articulation of tacit knowledge as explicit
knowledge."192 Essentially externalisation is the process of "concept creation and is
often triggered by dialogue or collective reflection."193This means expressing that
which is tacit in terms of language, thus converting it to explicit. The conceptual tools
available for articulating something inherently tacit are amongst others metaphors
and analogies. Metaphor provides a way of grasping one thing in terms of another
thing, whilst analogy links something unknown to something known.v" Iterative
rounds of expression and reflection sharpens the concepts distilled from the shared
tacit knowledge produced in the previous mode, until these concepts can form the
building blocks of a model.
The mode of externalisation is the focal point of Nonaka's theory. Even though new
ideas can only be expected to be come across in the tacit realm, Nonaka insists that
"[a]mong the four modes of knowledge conversion, externalization holds the key to
knowledge creation, because it creates new, explicit concepts from tacit
knowledge."195 Although Nonaka starts and ends the explanation of the SECI-model
with the tacit knowledge of the individual, the underlying logic of the spiral is driven
by the requirements of organisational explicit knowledge. The demands for new
knowledge made on the tacit realm are directed by the requirements of already
existing explicit knowledge. The underlying assumption of the notion of knowledge
conversion is clear: tacit knowledge is not-yet-realised explicit knowledge and from
here the emphasis on externalisation follows naturally.
1.4.3 COMBINAnON
Combination is the process of systemising and classifying new explicit knowledge in
order to integrate it with the existing body of explicit knowledge. In other words,
192 Nonaka, Toyama, and Byesiere. A Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation: 495.
193 Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 64.
194 Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 66; Nonaka, Toyama, and
Byesiere. A Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation: 495.
195Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 66.
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explicit interacting with explicit knowledge.t= This process of integration through
"combining and categorising can create new knowledge."I97
In practice, combination entails three processes. First, explicit
knowledge is collected from inside and outside the organisation and
then combined. Second, new explicit knowledge is disseminated
among the organisational members. Third, the explicit knowledge is
edited or processed in the organisation in order to make it more
useable.l"
Essentially this mode of knowledge conversion involves the re-configuration of
already existing explicit knowledge. The outcome is often in the form of a prototype,
a model or a business system that incorporates the newly conceptualised idea into
existing knowledge routines of the other parts of the organisation.!"
1.4.4 INTERNALISAnON
Finally, internalisation is a process of turning the new explicit knowledge into tacit
knowledge. "When experiences through socialisation, externalisation and
combination are internalised into individuals' [own] tacit knowledge bases in the
,
form of shared mental models or technical know-how, they become valuable
assets."200
The acting out of explicit knowledge in practice already starts the conversion of
explicit into tacit knowledge. By participating in the process of product development
part of the explicit knowledge used there is embodied in practice and thus
internalised.ë" If first hand experience is not an option, it is possible to achieve this
embodiment through simulation (emulating the experience) or some form of
1% Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 67; Nonaka, Toyama, and
Byosiëre. A Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation: 497.
197 Nonaka, Toyama, and Byosiere. A Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation: 497.
198 Nonaka, Toyama, and Byosiere. A Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation: 497.
199 Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 71.
200 Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 69.
201 Nonaka, Toyama, and Byesiere. A Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation: 497.
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participation in the vicarious experience of another person (for example by reading a
report).
The difficulty for Nonaka's theory is that the initial commitment to the primacy of
tacit knowledge as the source of new knowledge implies that at a certain point some
of what had to be explicated, in order to produce a product or deliver a service, has to
be made tacit again to allow for the advancement of knowledge. In other words, the
modes of externalisation and combination must in some way alter the tacit realm
where its origins lie in order to affect future instances of innovation. The mode of
internalisation thus allows the process to start again once the spiral ends in the tacit
realm. "[T]he tacit knowledge accumulated at the individual level needs to be
socialised with other organisational members, thereby starting a new spiral of
knowledge creation."202
1.4.5 THE KNOWLEDGE SPIRAL
In summary, tacit and explicit knowledge interact with each other in a spiralling
process that continuously moves through these different modes of knowledge
conversion. Nonaka calls this the epistemological dimension of knowledge
creation.ë'" To justify the claim that this is a theory of organisational knowledge
creation and not merely a theory of individual creativity, the spiral process also needs
to account for the "organisational amplification" and mobilisation of individual tacit
know ledge.204
Thus, organisational knowledge creation is a spiral process, starting at
the individual level and moving up through expanding communities
of interaction, that crosses sectional, departmental, divisional, and
organisational boundaries.ê"
202 Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 69.
203Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 72.
204 Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 72.
205 Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 72.
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1.5 FIVE PHASES OF ORGANISATIONAL KNOWLEDGE
CREATION
For this reason the interactive process between tacit and explicit through the various
modes of knowledge conversion, is not simply a circular movement, but a spiral one
that moves from interaction on the individual, to the group, to the organisational
level and so forth. Through the cross-levelling of knowledge, new spirals of
knowledge creation are started.
In the original Harvard Business Review article on organisational knowledge
creation, Nonaka and Takeuchi distilled their five phases of the process of knowledge
creation from a case study involving the development of a bread-making machine.ë"
The different modes of the SEeI-model more or less fits the phases of the knowledge
creation process.
1.5.1 SHARING TACIT KNOWLEDGE
Nonaka and Takeuchi assumes that strictly speaking organisations cannot create
knowledge as a collective, ultimately innovation relies on ideas rooted in the mind of
an individual. This assumption legitimates their interest in the phenomenon of
(individual) tacit knowledge:
Since tacit knowledge held by individuals is the basis of
organisational knowledge creation, it seems natural to start the
process by focussing on tacit knowledge, which is the rich untapped
source of new knowledge.ë"
Accordingly the first phase in the process of organisational knowledge creation is the
sharing of tacit knowledge among individuals. The difficulty in sharing this tacit
knowledge relates to the observation that it "cannot be communicated or passed onto
206 Nonaka. The Knowledge-Creating Company.
207 Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 85.
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others easily, since it is acquired primarily through experience.''208From this follows
firstly that in order for sharing of tacit knowledge to take place, individuals need to
interact with each other in a face-ta-face setting. Secondly it is implied that, although
low in conscious communication, this co-located interaction is rich in the (wordless)
exchange of experiences and perspectives. Thirdly, the notion of sharing implies that
individuals possess sufficiently different backgrounds to make some sort of exchange
possible, but share enough of a common frame of reference to facilitate the process of
socialization.ë'? The prevalent mode of knowledge conversion in this phase of
knowledge creation is clearly the mutual conversion of tacit knowledge from
individuals into the tacit knowledge of other individuals present in the field of face-
to-face interaction - in other words the mode of Socialization.
1.5.2 CREATING CONCEPTS
Once the process of sharing tacit knowledge has led to the emergence of a shared
mental model, it has to be articulated in a process of "collective reflection."210During
this phase figurative language is used to verbalise knowledge content that was
arrived at wordlessly. The corresponding mode of knowledge conversion is that of
Externalisation and involves the conversion of tacit into explicit knowledge.
1.5.3 JUSTIFYING CONCEPTS
Nonaka builds into the process of knowledge creation a "screening process" to
determine "if the newly created concepts are truly worthwhile for the organisation
and society."211Even though Nonaka claims in more than one place that in his theory
of organisational knowledge creation, "knowledge is defined as justified true
be!ief,"212he does not use the term 'justification' in the sense it is normally used in the
philosophy of science and epistemology. The orthodox view of the problem of
208 Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 85.
209 From this it should be clear why the enabling conditions of Requisite Variety (pp.74-75)
and Intention (pp.82-83) are necessary parts of Nonaka's theory.
210 Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 85.
211 Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 86.
212 Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 21, 58, 86.
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justification concerns not only what humans can know, but how they can lay claim to
true knowledge. Justification of knowledge is about the validation of knowledge by
means of scientific verification. This method usually emphasises empirical proof (or
at least testability), as well as pragmatic validation in the form of demonstrated
explanatory power.
Clearly this is not the case for Nonaka's theory of knowledge creation. Nonaka's
criteria for justification "include cost, profit margin, and the degree to which a
product can contribute to the firm's growth,"213whilst other criteria might "include
value premises such as adventure, romanticism, and aesthetical."214The justification
criteria in an organisation thus falls under the auspices of organisational strategy and
vision, hence the importance of the enabling condition of Intention.
As Essers and Schreinemakers-" have pointed out, Nonaka's "subjective"
understanding of the notion of knowledge justification opens his theory of
knowledge creation to the problems of incommensurability and cognitive
relativism.ê"
In terms of Nonaka's framework the problem of incommensurability refers to an
unbridgeable gap between rivalling mental models - a possibility that Nonaka does
not seem to consider. The resultant impossibility of communication is not only the
result of perceptual and linguistic differences stemming from the different cognitive
frameworks, but also the lack of a common reference point or "lack of common
standards or lack of consensus on the .... priority of such standards."217
When it comes to the problem of cognitive relativism, Schreinemakers and Essers
note that:
213 Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 86.
214 Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 87.
215 Schreinemakers and Essers. Nonaka's Subjectivist Conception of Knowledge in Corporate
Knowledge Management.
216 Schreinemakers and Essers. Nonaka's Subjectivist Conception of Knowledge in Corporate
Knowledge Management: 28-29.
217 Schreinemakers and Essers. Nonaka's Subjectivist Conception of Knowledge in Corporate
Knowledge Management: 29.
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Nonaka threatens to run into a dangerous form of relativism and
arbritrariness in the context of knowledge justification when the
assessment standards he proclaims for knowledge creation are limited
to purely economic or financial performance criteria.s"
It is notable that this phase of the knowledge creation process does not fit any direct
corresponding mode of knowledge conversion in terms of Nonaka's knowledge
spiral. This adds weight to the reservations expressed by Schreinemakers and Essers
regarding the utility of Nonaka's model for corporate knowledge management and
organisational innovation.
1.5.4 BUILDING AN ARCHETYPE
Assuming however that the concept is justified along the criteria posed by Nonaka,
the next step would be to convert it into an archetype. Depending on the concept, the
archetype can be a model or a prototype-" Essentially this phase in the process
involves the utilisation of existing explicit knowledge to give the newly explicated
concept a tangible form. Since this phase involves the integration of new explicit
knowledge with the body of explicit knowledge already available, it corresponds
with the mode of Combination.
1.5.5 CROSS-LEVELLING KNOWLEDGE
The process of organisational knowledge creation is not complete at this point, since
the knowledge embodied in the archetype "can trigger a new cycle of knowledge
creation."220This last phase is called the "cross-levelling of knowledge." On one level
it is the transfer and application of newly developed knowledge in areas where it was
not originally intended for. On another level it is the absorption of the new explicit
knowledge by individuals so that it affects their tacit knowledge base, which in tum
218 Schreinemakers and Essers. Nonaka's Subjectivist Conception of Knowledge in Corporate
Knowledge Management: 32.
219 Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 87-88.
220 Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 88.
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1.6 THE CONCEPT OF "BA"
introduces the possibility of another cycle of innovation.ë" This phase relates to the
mode of Internalisation and involves the conversion of explicit knowledge back into
tacit knowledge, thus completing one round of the knowledge spiral.222
In a later version of Nonaka's model the five-phase process of knowledge creation is
replaced by a three-layered knowledge creation process.s> In this version the SEeI-
model takes place in the context of Ba (platforms for knowledge creation) and utilises
knowledge assets that in tum moderates the Ba -contexts, Despite these adjustments,
the SEeI-model is retained as a unit in its entirety. For that reason, these adjustments
to Nonaka's theory do not really change its character. A digression on the notion of
Ba is after all worthwhile, since it displays a particular blind spot that Nonaka has
regarding the ontological implications of Polanyi's epistemology.
Ba is "the context in which knowledge is shared, created and utilized, in recognition
of the fact that knowledge needs a context in order to exist."224Each mode of
knowledge conversion in the SEeI-model then has a corresponding shared space of
interaction. "Originating Ba is the place where individuals share feelings, emotions,
experiences, and mental models,"22s and clearly corresponds to the face-to-face
context of the mode of Socialization in the SECI-model. "Interacting Ba is the place
where tacit knowledge is made explicit,"226and thus corresponds with the mode of
externalisation. Since the integration of various kinds of explicit knowledge is "most
efficiently supported in collaborative environments utilizing information
221 The notion of cross-levelling of knowledge is similar to Kogut and Zander's ideas on
combinative capabilities, meaning the generation of new applications from existing
knowledge. See, Kogut, B and U Zander. 1996.What Firms Do? Coordination, Identity,
and Learning, Organization Science 7.
222 Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 89.
223 Nonaka, Toyama, and Byosiere. A Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation.
224 Nonaka, Toyama, and Byosiëre. A Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation: 499.
225 Nonaka and Konno. The Concept of "Ba":46.
226 Nonaka and Konno. The Concept of "Ba":47.
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technology," the mode of combination is taking place in "Cyber Ba."227 Lastly
"Exercising Ba" supports the mode of internalization.ë"
At first glance the concept of Ba seems an unnecessary introduction of a further
element of mysticism to the SECI-model. The point to recognise however, is that the
concept of Ba was introduced to counter allegations that the SECI-model effectively
amounts to relativism, because there are no justification criteria independent from the
strategic vision of the management of the organisation.ë?
Nonaka attempted to restate his more holistic and dialectical view of
tacit and explicit knowledge when he republished the model utilising
the Japanese word Ba, but by this time the simple two by two of the
SECr model was too well established in business plans, software
brochures and the structured methods of consultants to be restored to
its original intent,230
According to Nonaka and Konno, "Ba may also be thought of as the recognition of
the self in all."231Thus participation in Ba implies transcendence of one's own limited
perspective. In the words of Nonaka: "Within Ba, real-time knowledge creation is
achieved through self-transcendence."232 The concept of Ba is therefore Nonaka's
attempt to show that his epistemology is not properly understood when called
"subjectivist."233 It seems as if Nonaka appropriated Polanyi's epistemology, but not
the ontology from which it derives. "Nonaka and Takeuchi were only seeking to
contrast a claimed Japanese tradition of 'Oneness' with a rational, analytical and
227 Nonaka and Konno. The Concept of "Ba":47.
228 Nonaka and Konno. The Concept of "Ba":47.
229 Schreinemakers and Essers. Nonaka's Subjectivist Conception of Knowledge in Corporate
Knowledge Management.
230 Snowden. Complex Acts of Knowing: 101.
231 Nonaka and Konno. The Concept of "Ba":40.
232 Nonaka and Konno. The Concept of "Ba":45.
233 Schreinemakers and Essers. Nonaka's Subjectivist Conception of Knowledge in Corporate
Knowledge Management.
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Cartesian western tradition."234Nonaka's ontology stresses the "oneness of Humanity
and Nature", the "oneness of Body and Mind" and the "oneness of Self and Other."235
With this ontology in mind, Nonaka sees the organisation as "an organic
configuration of (various) Ba instead of organisational structure."236 As a result the
knowledge-creating process is not a matter of anything goes, but through
participation in various Ba, is necessarily context specific, yet provides participants
with the means for transcending the immediate context.ê"
One cannot draw a direct comparison between the concept of Ba and the ontological
aspects of the concept of tacit knowledge in the theory of Polanyi, but both concepts
can be interpreted as attempts to circumvent the subject-object split. Polanyi achieves
this by arguing that all knowledge is grounded in the practices that constitute tacit
knowledge, thus effectively collapsing the objective in the subjective. The importance
of the notions of tradition and cultural apprenticeship provides the cognitive limiting
factors guarding against the charge of 'anything-goes' relativism. The fact that
Nonaka has to resort to Japanese philosophy and the concept of Ba, whilst the
conceptual tools were already available to him in the theory of Polanyi, underlines
the fact that Nonaka' s did not retain the full implications of Polanyi's
conceptualisation of the concept of tacit knowledge.
1.7 COMPARING NONAKA WITH POLANYI
The differences with Polanyi become apparent early on, as Nonaka introduces an
iceberg metaphor to distinguish between tacit and explicit knowledge, when it is
claimed that "knowledge expressed in words and numbers represents only the tip of
the iceberg."238The iceberg metaphor seems to suggest that knowledge is inherently
234 Snowden. Complex Acts of Knowing: 101.
235Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 59.
236 Nonaka and Toyama. A Firm as a Dialectical Being: 1001.
237Nonaka and Toyama. A Firm as a Dialectical Being: 1002.
238 Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 8.
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tacit or inherently explicit. This vision of tacit and explicit knowledge as a sharp
dichotomy, is alien to Polanyi's own understanding.s" Tsoukas argued that
management studies have largely misunderstood what Polanyi meant with the
concept of tacit knowledge by conceiving of it "in opposition to explicit knowledge,
whereas it is simply its other side."240
Brohm argues that the iceberg metaphor misrepresents the relation between tacit and
explicit knowledge.ë' He proposes the metaphor of a theatre stage that has a certain
setting, actors, props, a script and so forth, but everything is not always in focus,
through the use of lighting, positioning of actors, dialogue and stage direction a
certain focus is established. Naturally this focus changes during the course of the
play, bringing elements from the background into focus in tum. Brohm uses the stage
then as a metaphor to describe the Polanyi's conception of the relation between tacit
and explicit knowledge:
The focus reflects explicit knowledge, while the rest of the stage,
functioning to support that focus, reflects tacit knowledge .... Just like
the focus on the stage is a result of the skill of the stage manager,
integrating separate elements on the stage into one focal point, explicit
knowledge results from a mental and skilful act of integration,
integrating subsidiary parts into a coherent entity.242
Brohm does not have the conversion of tacit knowledge in mind. With the shift of
focus, he tries to show that Polanyi used the concept of tacit knowledge to describe
the logical structure of knowledge. Seen in this perspective tacit knowledge always
239 There is a whole discourse on the differences between Nonaka and Polanyi. See, Brohm.
Bringing Polanyi onto the Theatre Stage, ; Leonard and Sensiper. The Role of Tacit
Knowledge in Group Innovation; Schreinemakers and Essers. Nonaka's Subjectivist
Conception of Knowledge in Corporate Knowledge Management; Spender. Competitive
Advantage from Tacit Knowledge? Unpacking the Concept and lts Strategic Implications;
Tsoukas. Do We Really Understand Tacit Knowledge? ; Whitley. Tacit and Explicit
Knowledge.
240 Tsoukas. Do We Really Understand Tacit Knowledge?
241 Brohm. Bringing Polanyi onto the Theatre Stage,
242Brohm. Bringing Polanyi onto the Theatre Stage: 3.
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1.7.1 ENABLING TACIT GERMINATION VS MOBILISING TACIT CONTENT
underlies explicit knowledge. Saying that for some knowledge to be in focus (explicit)
there has to be a background (tacit knowledge), does not amount to saying that the
background cannot be brought into focus. But it does mean that it can only be
brought into focus if some other elements forms a background against which it can
be off-set. On the basis of the analysis of Polanyi in the previous chapter, one could
say that Brohm is optimistic about the specifiability of tacit knowledge, yet his
example of the theatre stage underlines the fundamental difference between
conceiving of tacit knowledge as a knowledge content, which can be converted into
explicit content, and tacit knowledge as the logical structure underlying explicit
knowledge.
Nonaka's central argument is that knowledge management practices should aim at
providing "enabling" organisational conditions for the tacit dimension to thrive,
because new ideas germinate in the unstructured subjective domain of human
existence.ëê Explaining the creation of new knowledge is the stated primary concern
of Nonaka and Takeuchi's dynamic theory. However, as Stacey points out, Nonaka
actually only defers the explanation of the origin of new knowledge to the tacit
realm.ë+ Upon closer analysis, Nonaka's theory of organisational knowledge creation
fails to adequately explain the creation of knowledge at the individual level. The
origin of the new tacit knowledge in the head of the individual is not properly
explained. Stacey shows how Nonaka's model relies on a distinction between
individual and organisational levels of analysis that makes it difficult to see this
shortcoming in explanatory power.
The phenomenon of tacit knowledge is linked to the individual and does not have a
collective equivalent. Tacit knowledge is therefore not the same as organisational
knowledge. By contrast, the routines in the work of Nelson and Winter and the
dynamic capabilities in the work of Teece were instances of organisational
knowledge that is both social and tacit. The way Nonaka sees it, an organisation
243 Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 73-83.
244 Stacey. Complex Responsive Processes in Organization: 14.
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feeds off the knowledge of its members. In other words, organisational knowledge
depends on the individual tacit knowledge contained in the heads of its members.
[An organisation can only be said to know, in as much as it] amplifies
the knowledge created by individuals and crystallises it as part of the
knowledge network of the organisation. This process takes place
within an expanding' community of interaction' which crosses intra-
and inter-organisational levels and boundaries.w
The link between the individual and the organisational levels is thus understood as
the process of interaction between individuals. It is exactly this process of interacting
that the SECI-model tries to explain. Nonaka's knowledge spiral promotes a view of
individuals constructing (through the modes of externalisation and combination) the
explicit organisational levels of knowledge, which then through the mode of
internalisation affect the tacit knowledge sets of the individuals.ê=
Comparing the case of Nonaka with the way in which the concept is used in the work
of Nelson and Winter, one will see that for the evolutionary economists tacit
knowledge contains the possibilities for innovation, because the tacit
knowledge/skills complex represents a major component of the initial conditions for
any new discovery. Attempts to account for the lock-in effect of these initial
conditions often lead to sophisticated theories of path dependence in most
evolutionary theories.>" Although Nonaka looks to tacit knowledge to explain the
same problem of innovation, he portrays tacit knowledge as the source of innovation
and creativity without explicitly considering the limiting factors built into any notion
of initial conditions. Consequently, as part of Nonaka's model, the concept of tacit
knowledge has little technical significance other than serving as a label for the
245 Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 59.
246 Stacey. Complex Responsive Processes in Organization: 15.
247 Nooteboom, B. 1997. Path Dependence of Knowledge: Implications for the Theory of the
Firm, in Magnusson, L and J Ottosson, Evolutionary Economics and Path Dependence.
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar
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subjective domain that is the source of new knowledge, yet at the same time is
inaccessible to analysis.
Not only is the function of the concept of tacit knowledge inNonaka's theory limited
to being a mere label for the creative subjective resource from whence new
knowledge emerge, but also the SECI-model attributes greater importance to
knowledge transmission than other theories primarily concerned with innovation.
Explaining the relation between tacit and explicit knowledge in terms of the spiral
process of interaction leads to a secondary argument, namely that innovative
organisations are those that succeed in tapping and mobilising the tacit knowledge of
their members. Logically, this leads to knowledge management practices that actively
seek to externalise (codify) the tacit knowledge of the organisation, rather than enable
the ripening of tacit knowledge. In other words, it might be individuals who create
new knowledge, but seen from an organisational perspective the main problem is
leveraging that individual insight throughout the organisation. This leads to practices
aimed at capturing, storing and sharing individual knowledge. In terms of
intellectual capital theory it leads to practices to tum human capital into forms of
structural capital. The primary concern moves from generating new knowledge
(innovation) to codifying and diffusing existing knowledge (logistics).
For Polanyi the activities of innovation and problem solving have more to do with his
notion of personal knowledge and the commitment that it signifies on the part of the
knower (scientist) than with the technical term of "tacit knowing". In fact, Polanyi
resorted to the term "tacit knowing" rather than "tacit knowledge" to show that the
relation has to do with two different kinds of awareness rather than two different
forms of content of knowing. While Polanyi explained the relation between the tacit
and explicit dimensions in logical terms, Nonaka's spiral model tries to describe the
process of interaction and transmission in practical terms. Thus, combining an
epistemological distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge with the spiral
process of interaction fits neatly with the knowledge processes of generation,
diffusion and application in organisations.
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The dual nature of Nonaka's theory, part knowledge creation theory and part
knowledge processing theory, accounts for the success and the partial
misinterpretation of Nonaka's theory as the basis for knowledge processing
application at the expense of knowledge creation. Almost directly opposite to the
knowledge creation concerns that were Nonaka's starting point.
1.7.2 CONCLUSION
This chapter showed how the concept of tacit knowledge underwent a number of
small adjustments, from its first adaptation by Nelson and Winter as part of a critique
of neoclassical theories of the firm, to its role as part of a critique of the information
processing paradigm by scholars using the dynamic firm capabilities approach, and
lastly to its superficial role as the label for individual creativity in Nonaka's theory. It
was also shown how these small adjustments ironically allowed the information
processing paradigm to exact revenge on Nonaka's application of the concept of tacit
knowledge, in that Nonaka stripped the concept of theoretical functions other than
being a conceptual label for the black box of human creativity. As a result Nonaka's
theory was vulnerable to over-interpretation and was eventually fitted into an
objectivist information processing paradigm. Snowden neatly summarises the
dilemma of Nonaka's theory:
[Nonaka's] work derived in the main from the study of innovation in
manufacturing processes where tacit knowledge is rendered explicit to
the degree necessary to enable that process to take place; it did not follow
that all of the knowledge in the designers' heads and conversations
had, should or could have been made explicit. In partial contrast, early
knowledge programmes attempted to disembody all knowledge from
its possessors to make it an organisational asset,248
Fact remains that Nonaka's theory became very popular, because it combined such a
wide array of approaches to organisations. The different modes of Nonaka's
knowledge spiral each appeals to a different sector of organisation theory. Nonaka
248 Snowden. Complex Acts of Knowing: 101.
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and Takeuchi anticipated that the mode of socialisation could be "connected with
theories of group processes and organisational culture."249 In tum the mode of
combination resonates with information processing, and the mode of internalisation
with organisational learning.s" That leaves the mode of externalisation, an area that
Nonaka and Takeuchi regarded as neglected. They formulated their theory of
organisational knowledge creation to correct this neglect of externalisation.P' In
retrospect one can argue that the notion of convertible tacit knowledge was
favourably received at a certain point of maturation of knowledge management
theory when the main concern was with turning individual knowledge into
organisational assets. Hence the mode of externalisation filled a gap at an appropriate
time.
Nevertheless the primacy ascribed to the mode of externalisation is based on a
particular view of the nature of knowledge and an accompanying model of
communication. These will be considered in the next chapter that illustrates how the
secondary concern of knowledge conversion in Nonaka's theory, became a primary
concern in post-Nonaka knowledge management theory.
249Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 62.
250 Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 62.
251 Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 62.
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Chapter Four
TH E RECEPTION OF TACIT
KNOWLEDGE IN KNOWLEDGE
MANAGEMENT THEORY
As difficult as it is to codify tacit knowledge, its substantial value makes it
worth the effort.
Thomas Davenport & Larry Prusak, "Working Knowledge."
1.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter aims to put forward the principal results and implications flowing from
the conceptual analysis in the previous two chapters. The conclusions reached
regarding the role of the concept of tacit knowledge in the theories of Polanyi and
Nonaka are illustrated by gauging the reception of the concept of tacit knowledge in
post-Nonaka knowledge management theory. Even though the concept of tacit
knowledge is subject to varied and inconsistent application in organisation theory,
there is a trend in knowledge management theory of writers using the concept of tacit
knowledge as "an almost default epistemology."252
Rather than specifying a collection of knowledge management writers, the
illustration is drawn from the commentary of another set of writers - chiefly
252 Stacey. Complex Responsive Processes in Organization: 13.
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Haridimos Tsoukas.ë" Ralph Stacey,254Jos Schreinemakers.ê" and René Brohm-= -
whose viewpoints criticise this trend in knowledge management theory that, in their
opinion, more or less build on Nonaka's theory.s" 258 Rather than dealing directly
with individual knowledge management authors, this chapter aligns with the
viewpoints of this group of commentators. Their interpretation of a 'post-Nonaka'-
trend in knowledge management theory is used to illustrate the impact of Nonaka's
adaptation of Polanyi's conception of tacit knowledge on the reception, and eventual
function, of the concept in knowledge management theory.
1.2 KNOWLEDGE AS INOT - INFORMATION'
The analysis of Nonaka concluded with showing that the dynamic firm capabilities
tradition, through which Nonaka became familiar with the concept of tacit
knowledge, is concerned with explaining the generation of new knowledge,
something which the information processing view of organizations largely ignores.
Thus, it was concluded that viewing Nonaka in terms of the tradition of dynamic
253 Tsoukas. The Firm as a Distributed Knowledge System; Tsoukas. Do We Really
Understand Tacit Knowledge?
254 Stacey. Complex Responsive Processes in Organization
255 Schreinemakers and Essers. Nonaka's Subjectivist Conception of Knowledge in Corporate
Knowledge Management.
256 Brahm. Bringing Polanyi onto the Theatre Stage,
257 Tsoukas considers Nonaka and Takeuchi to be "the two authors who, more than anyone
else, have helped popularise the concept of 'tacit knowledge' in management studies and
whose interpretation has been adopted by most management authors (see for example,
Ambrosini and Bowman, 2001; Baumard, 1999;Boisot, 1995;Davenport and Prusak, 1998;
Devlin, 1999;Dixon, 2000; Leonard and Sensiper, 1998;Spender, 1996; von Krogh et aI,
2000 for exceptions see, Brown and Duguid, 2000; Cook and Brown, 1999;Kreiner, 1999;
Tsoukas, 1996; 1997;Wenger, 1998)." See, Tsoukas. Do We Really Understand Tacit
Knowledge?
258 Stacey also considers Nonaka pivotal for knowledge management theory: "[Nonaka] relies
heavily on [a] distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge [and is] widely quoted
in many academic papers and also in the more popular books .1will refer to this body of
work as the mainstream literature on organisationallearninglknowledge creation because
it has now become commonplace .... to think and talk either within its terms or in critique
of it .... Indrawing out the main features of the underlying frame of reference in
mainstream thinking, I tum to .... a sample of writers for practitioners who rely on concepts
from that literature (Brown, 1991;Burton-James, 1999;Davenport and Prusak, 1998;
Garven, 1993;Kleiner and Roth, 1997;Leonard and Strauss, 1997;Quinn et.al., 1996; Sveiby,
1997)." See, Stacey. Complex Responsive Processes in Organization: 13-14.
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firm capabilities, the concept of tacit knowledge describes the source or wellspring of
individual creativity. However, it was shown that, unlike his predecessors in
evolutionary economics and dynamic firm capabilities, Nonaka's theory does not
fully account for the origin of new knowledge, other than consign it to the
unstructured realm of individual ideas, memories, dreams, and desires. Instead
Nonaka's theory assumes the continual generation of new knowledge in the tacit
realm (located in the heads of individuals) and then describes the process of
interaction that leads to organisational knowledge creation.
The SECI-model explains this process of interaction between tacit and explicit
knowledge and also individual and organisational (social) knowledge. Snowden
argues that this SECI-model of interaction provided early knowledge management
theory with the theoretical grounding that it needed:
To all intents and purposes, knowledge management started circa
1995with the popularisation of the SEC!model [ofNonaka and
Takeuchi] with its focus on the movement of knowledge between tacit
and explicit states ... 259
Nonaka's SECI-model combines the idea of new tacit knowledge content, that can be
converted into explicit content, with the spiral movement of that knowledge from the
level of the individual to the level of the organization. This model of interaction
between different kinds of knowledge and different organisational levels £itwell with
the concerns of knowledge creation, codification, and transfer, which are typical of
knowledge management. As a result, Nonaka's distinction between tacit and explicit
knowledge became a theoretical foundation for a large body of knowledge
management theory.
Yet, Hedesstrom and Whitley pointed out that "the literature on knowledge
management is particularly vague about what is meant by tacit knowledge."26o The
distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge seems to relate to the degree of
259 Snowden. Complex Acts of Knowing: 101.
260 Whitley and Hedesstrom. What Is Meant by Tacit Knowledge?
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Whether a particular bit of knowledge is in principle articulable or
necessarily tacit is not the relevant question in most behavioural
situations. Rather the question is whether the costs associated with the
obstacles to articulation are sufficiently high so that the knowledge in
fact remains tacit.262
formalisation, or potential for formalisation, of knowledge. While most knowledge
management writers seem to agree that tacit knowledge is embodied knowledge and
in this sense resides in people, there are differences of opinion as to why this is the
case. Hedesstrom and Whitley argue that most knowledge management writers can
be grouped into two schools of thought on this issue. They argue that the dominant
view in knowledge management theory is one that sees tacit knowledge simply as
knowledge that has not yet been formalised.ë'
This idea that all tacit knowledge could be formalised is already present in Nelson
and Winter, because in their theory this issue does not appear to have any bearing on
the inherent characteristics of tacit knowledge. Instead they argue that cost factors
determine whether or not tacit knowledge become formalised:
According to this view then, tacit knowledge might be difficult to externalise, but it is
- at least theoretically - possible. It corresponds with Nonaka's own view of the
phenomenon of tacit knowledge. The difficulty involved with articulating tacit
knowledge is the reason why Nonaka stresses the importance of figurative and
metaphorical language during the mode of externalisation.
According to Heddesstrom and Whitley there is a minority viewpoint on the nature
of tacit knowledge in knowledge management theory and this group of writers see
the phenomenon of tacit knowledge as knowledge that cannot be codified. This is
either because the knowledge relies on embodied skills, or because it is a form of
knowledge that is beyond the powers of Ianguage.ës Hedesstrom and Whitley
261 Whitley and Hedesstrom. What Is Meant by Tacit Knowledge?
262 Nelson and Winter. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change: 82 ..
263 Whitley and Hedesstrom. What Is Meant by Tacit Knowledge?
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conclude that despite this ambivalence with regard to the concept of tacit knowledge,
it makes little difference whether authors maintain that tacit knowledge is knowledge
that is impossible to codify or simply knowledge that has not yet been codified. The
flipside remains that:
Explicit knowledge is predominantly thought of as knowledge that is
possible to articulate or formalise. Some authors use the term' codified
knowledge' instead of' explicit knowledge' for all knowledge that is
not tacit. Some of these scholars equate codified knowledge with
knowledge that de facto has been articulated/written down, while
others refer to it as knowledge that is ... codifiable.s=
Brohm also cites a number of examples of writers that equates articulated or codified
knowledge with the explicit knowledge category from Nonaka, and see tacit
knowledge as that which is hard or impossible to codify and therefore transmit as
information, "[e]xamples are amongst others Weggeman (1997), Raelin (1997),
Inkpen (1996) or Leonard (1998)."265266Brohm also points to what he considers to be
even more extreme examples of writers who speak "of knowledge assets that can be
transferred."267 Here he points to Boisot and Davenport and Prusak.ë"
It appears as if the function of the concept of tacit knowledge in the theories of post-
Nonaka knowledge management writers, is closely linked to the way they attempt to
distinguish between information and knowledge. Quite a number of writers view
tacit knowledge as knowledge that has not yet been formalised and therefore it
264 Whitley and Hedesstrom. What Is Meant by Tacit Knowledge?
265Brahm. Bringing Polanyi onto the Theatre Stage: 4.
266 The references for these writers are, Inkpen, A. 1996.Creating Knowledge through
Collaboration, California Management Review 39/ 1; Leonard and Sensiper. The Role of Tacit
Knowledge in Group Innovation; Raelin, J. 1997.A Model of Work-Based Learning,
Organization Science 8/ 6;Weggeman. Kennismanagement
267Brahm. Bringing Polanyi onto the Theatre Stage: 4.
268 Boisot, M. 1995. Information Space: A Framework for Learning in Organizations, Institutions and
Culture. London: Routledge; Davenport, Tand L Prusak. 1998.Working Knowledge: How
Organizations Manage What They Know. Boston MA: Harvard Business School Press
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cannot be readily communicated as information. 269One such writer is Mathieu
Weggeman and the points made above can be illustrated by reviewing the way in
which he modifies Nonaka's theory.
According to Weggeman, knowledge is a personal capacity that has to be seen as the
product of information, experience, skills and attitude that a person commands at a
particular point in time. He expresses this formulation in the following equation:
K=I.ESA.270He then proceeds to liken the information component to Nonaka's
explicit knowledge. Weggeman does not work with a formal definition of
information, but means with it knowledge that can readily be written down or
expressed in the form of symbols.>" The crucial feature of explicit knowledge is then
that it can be turned into person-independent information which can be
communicated free from the constraints of embodiment.s? The ESA-component of
the equation, which includes experience, skills and attitude, is then linked with
Nonaka's understanding of tacit knowledge.
269See for example the use of the concept by the following writers, Ambrosini and Bowman.
Tacit Knowledge: Some Suggestions for Operationalisation; Baumard. Tacit Knowledge in
Organizations; Haldin-Herrgard. Difficulties in Diffusion of Tacit Knowledge in
Organizations; Herschel, Nemati, and Steiger. Tacit to Explicit Knowledge Conversion:
Knowledge Exchange Protocols; Jankowicz. Why Does Subjectivity Make Us Nervous?
Making the Tacit Explicit; Johannessen, Olaisen, and Olsen. Mismanagement of Tacit
Knowledge: The Importance of Tacit Knowledge, the Danger of Information Technology,
and What to Do About It;Leonard and Sensiper. The Role of Tacit Knowledge in Group
Innovation; Saint-Onge. Tacit Knowledge: The Key to the Strategic Alignment of
Intellectual Capital; Schariq. How Does Knowledge Transform as It Is Transferred?
Speculations on the Possibility of a Cognitive Theory of Knowledge Landscapes; Smith.
The Role of Tacit and Explicit Knowledge in the Workplace.
270 Weggeman. Kennismanagement: 33.
271 Weggeman. Kennismanagement: 34.
272 Weggeman. Kennismanagement: 34.
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"Tacit knowledge is persoonlijke kennis die moeilijk te formaliseren is
en daardoor niet goed te delen met anderen. Subjectieve inzichten,
intuïties, ingevingen en voorgevoelens behoren ertoe." [Tacit
knowledge is personal knowledge that is difficult to formalise and
therefore hard to share with others. It includes subjective insights,
intuition, hunches and gut feelings (own translation)]273
The category "experience" includes knowledge the collection of personal knowledge
accumulated through past experiences. This collection of internalised knowledge is
considered to be the source of our "gevoelens, associaties, fantasieën en intuïties"
[feelings, associations, fantasies and intuitive thoughts (own translation)].274 All the
information that one internalises or remembers (sometimes imperfectly or in a
distorted manner) naturally becomes part of this collection of experientially acquired
knowledge. This category roughly equates with what Nonaka calls the cognitive
elements of the phenomenon of tacit knowledge, that "refer to an individual's images
of reality and visions of the future."275
The "skills" category includes the repertoire of cognitive skills that a person uses to
understand and use the explicit knowledge that confronts him/her in the form of new
information.ê" These more or less concur with Nonaka's technical elements of the
phenomenon of tacit knowledge that "includes concrete know-how, crafts, and
skills."277
Lastly, the "attitude" category refers to the values and beliefs that influences how a
person acts on the information with which he/she is confronted.ê" Once again it is
derived from Nonaka who says that "knowledge, unlike information, is about beliefs
273 Weggeman. Kennismanagement: 34.
274 Weggeman. Kennismanagement: 34.
275 Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 60.
276 Weggeman. Kennismanagement: 34.
277 Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 60.
278 Weggeman. Kennismanagement: 34-36.
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and commitment. Knowledge is a function of a particular stance, perspective or
intention."279
Taken together, experience, skills and attitude are examples of embodied and
therefore person-dependent knowledge that can only be shared through face-to-face
socialisation. The only alternative is to convert these forms of tacit knowledge
through the process of externalisation into explicit knowledge before it can then be
communicated as information.ë"
The reason for this particular view of the phenomenon of tacit knowledge seems to
be the fact that thinking about the nature of knowledge in knowledge management
theory predominantly took place against the intellectual backdrop of information
science theory.>' Subsequently, reflection on the concept of knowledge took place in
a context that was dominated by an already defined concept of information as
packaged data. This leads, firstly, to the assumption that information is something
that is measurable and quantifiable, while knowledge is in part the cognitive skill for
assessing, interpreting and using information. Secondly, it results in a kind of
conceptual inertia whereby information is thought of in terms of packaged data, and
knowledge, in tum, is thought of in terms of (value added) information. The result is
that the capacities ascribed to knowledge are defined from the concept of
information. Knowledge becomes information plus a mystical quality. In this context
the distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge became a conceptual tool for
qualifying the difference between information and knowledge. Thus knowledge is
equated with tacit knowledge and by implication explicit knowledge is equated with
information
279 Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 58.
280 Weggeman. Kennismanagement: 34.
281 Stacey. Complex Responsive Processes in Organization: 15.
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1.3 A COMMUNICATION MODEL FORTACIT KNOWLEDGE
The view of tacit knowledge as a category for those things that cannot be easily
transformed into and communicated as information is concurrent with a sender-
receiver model of communication. The basic communication situation is conceived of
as the exchange of information between individual actors. As Stacey points out, "it
posits a sender-receiver model of knowledge transmission in which individual A
sends some kind of signal to individual B, who receives it."282If one uses this
communication model as assumption, then Nonaka's SEer-model could fit into the
logic of the information processing paradigm - the same information processing view
of organisation which Nonaka's theory of knowledge creation was designed to
oppose.
Tacit knowledge, which is in the head of an individual, has to be converted into
explicit knowledge (externalisation), before it can be directly communicated. Once
converted, the resultant explicit knowledge can then be packaged in symbolic form
(information) and transmitted from one individual to another. As soon as the
message arrives, the receiver has to unpack the information, using the tacit
knowledge in his/her head to interpret the explicit knowledge confronting him/her.ë"
Assuming that the receiver has the appropriate base of tacit knowledge (cognitive
skills, contextual understanding) to understand the message, the relevant part of the
information will then be explicit knowledge to the receiver and in understanding or
using this explicit knowledge, the receiver internalises it and thus updates his/her
individual tacit knowledge.
Whilst this model of communication could be deemed compatible with Nonaka's
SECI-model, the concept of tacit knowledge is used somewhat differently in
knowledge management theory than in Nonaka's knowledge creation theory. If one
considers Nonaka's theory as an extension of the dynamic capabilities approach, then
the concept of tacit knowledge firstly functions as a placeholder concept for the
282Stacey. Complex Responsive Processes in Organization: 15.
283Stacey. Complex Responsive Processes in Organization: 16-17.
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subjective, unstructured realm of human creativity that is the wellspring of all new
knowledge. In terms of the communication model described here, the concept of tacit
knowledge functions as a type of knowledge content that cannot be readily
communicated.
The attributes ascribed to the concept of tacit knowledge in terms of the sender-
receiver communication model are not incompatible with Nonaka's theory - and
might very well have been latent in the SECI-model- but these attributes relate to the
secondary and not the primary concern in Nonaka's theory. In other words, using the
concept of tacit knowledge to theorise the concept of knowledge in terms of an
information paradigm, may well be feasible on the basis of the SECI-model (of the
interaction between different types of knowledge), but such a conceptualisation
makes it impossible to explain the generation of new knowledge.
If the function of the concept of tacit knowledge in post-Nonaka knowledge
management theory is compatible (although not in accord) with Nonaka's theory,
then it is wholly incompatible with Polanyi's conception of tacit knowledge. In the
chapter on Polanyi it was argued that, when using the concept of tacit knowledge in
the way Polanyi intended it, one cannot convert tacit knowledge into explicit
knowledge, nor can one package the content of tacit knowing into bits of information
in order to transfer it.
The real issue is not whether or not the phenomenon of tacit knowledge is convertible
or not. In the case of Nonaka and post-Nonaka knowledge management theory, the
phenomenon of tacit knowledge is thought of as referring to some or other cognitive
content. One could conceivably disagree with Nonaka and argue that (at least some)
tacit knowledge cannot be converted to explicit knowledge. In other words, one
could hold that there are categories of tacit knowledge content that can never be
articulated. But as far as the phenomenon of tacit knowledge is thought of as content,
such a position would still be closer to Nonaka and knowledge management theory
interpretations of the phenomenon of tacit knowledge than to Polanyi.
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In terms of Polanyi, tacit knowledge cannot be converted into explicit knowledge.
Not because of an inherent quality that defies articulation, but because it is not
properly the content of knowing. The concept of tacit knowledge, in terms of
Polanyi's understanding, refers to the structure of knowing. This means that it does
not exist without an integrative act of the knower. Tsoukas views attempts to
articulate tacit knowledge as suggested by Nonaka's mode of externalisation as a
practical impossibility.
Nonaka and Takeuchi's interpretation of tacit knowledge as
knowledge not-yet-articulated - knowledge awaiting for its
"translation" or "conversion" into explicit knowledge, an
interpretation that has been widely adopted in management studies,
is erroneous: it ignores the essential ineffability of tacit knowledge,
thus reducing it to what can be articulated.ë'
The sender-receiver communication model, which seems to be invariably assumed in
post-Nonaka knowledge management theory, is not compatible with Polanyi's
conception of tacit knowledge as an act of integration and with his views on
ineffability. Meaning can only be produced at the moment of the act of integration
when the subsidiary particulars are integrated into a meaningful whole. It has been
argued in chapter two that the building blocks of language - the vocabulary,
grammar, even the pronunciation - function during communication as part of a
bigger set of subsidiary particulars. This bigger set of subsidiaries include the past
experiences of the receiver, along with his/her values, cognitive skills, etc. To produce
meaning, all of these things have to be integrated into a meaningful whole by the
receiver. The meaning is therefore not packaged in the content that is being
communicated. The phenomenon of communication cannot properly conceived of as
knowledge transfer, because knowledge as such cannot be transferred, it has to be
integrated from the subsidiary particulars available to the knower. Hence, Polanyi's
use of tacit knowing as an integrative act, is not only incompatible with the sender-
284 Tsoukas. Do We Really Understand Tacit Knowledge?
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receiver communication model, but also incompatible with the idea of knowledge
transfer that is prominent in knowledge management theory.
1.4 BRIDGING THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL GAP
It is one thing to reduce knowledge to the category of tacit knowledge, but combined
with the sender-receiver model of communication, this category of knowledge is
relegated to the head of the individual. As was the case with Nonaka, tacit
knowledge remains a black box. What is more, it prevents thinking about the difficult
part of knowledge dynamics, namely the question of knowledge generation itself.
This raises the question of whether, in the case of post-Nonaka knowledge
management theory, the concept of tacit knowledge is performing any function other
than obfuscation?
If for all practical purposes the concept of tacit knowledge boils down to 'not-
information' and explicit knowledge to 'information' - then one has to ask why the
concept is used at all. It seems that in much of knowledge management theory the
distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge is just a convoluted way of stating
the common language distinction between knowledge and information. Could it be
that in those knowledge management theories and models where the conflation of
knowledge with tacit and information with explicit is complete, a form of
information management is parading as knowledge management?
Even so, the question remains what of specifically the concept of tacit knowledge
attracted the authors who employed it. Inother words, what were the environmental
factors that pushed these writers into incorporating the concept of tacit knowledge
into the information processing framework?
The following section will argue that the prevalence of the concept of tacit knowledge
in post-Nonaka knowledge management theory could be interpreted as an
epistemological stop-gap measure.
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Spender identifies the epistemological problem facing knowledge management when
he argues that most theories of organisational knowledge do not "challenge the
epistemological limits of scientific knowledge, [n]or do they seem adequate to a
theory of knowledge management."285 In this context the theory of Nonaka and its
adapted form of Polanyi's epistemology provided some form of epistemological
foothold. Spender is one of the knowledge management theorists who turned to the
concept of tacit knowledge as the basis for a knowledge management epistemology:
"While objective knowledge is similar to science - abstract and independent of the
knower - tacit knowledge is subjective and intimately tied up with the knower's
experience. "286
The orthodox philosophical discourse on the nature of knowledge was mostly
limited to scientific knowledge. Fittingly the traditional epistemological concerns
were the nature, sources and validity of knowledge. Hence, the epistemological
discourse raises questions about the scope and limits of knowledge, and about the
method and criteria for the justification of knowledge. These concerns of philosophy
do not always concur with the epistemological demands of knowledge management
theory, as noted by Schreinemakers and Essers.
Corporate knowledge management is primarily directed towards the
pragmatic objective of finding principles that may ensure the
successful application and utilization of knowledge, an objective that
has not been at the forefront of modem philosophical attention.s"
In contrast to science and philosophy with its objective of grounding knowledge in
justified true belief, knowledge management deals with knowledge as a
285 Spender. Competitive Advantage from Tacit Knowledge? Unpacking the Concept and lts
Strategic Implications: 58.
286 Spender. Competitive Advantage from Tacit Knowledge? Unpacking the Concept and lts
Strategic Implications: 58.
287 Schreinemakers and Essers. Nonaka's Subjectivist Conception of Knowledge in Corporate
Knowledge Management: 26.
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Corporate knowledge management has to work with the actual beliefs
and commitments of organisation members, whether or not they are
true or scientifically respectable.ë?
commodity-" or as a factor of production. The focus does not fall exclusively on
scientifically reliable knowledge, but on increasing the productivity of knowledge in
organisations. Productivity in this case means the capacity for value creation through
organisational action.
This shift in the meaning of knowledge leaves knowledge management theory with a
need for a broader theory of knowledge - not merely knowledge as justified true belief,
but knowledge as a capacity for organisational action.
One way to provide some sort of linkage, between the narrow concept of knowledge
in the traditional epistemology and the broader role of knowledge as a capacity for
action, is to relinquish the idea of objective knowledge. The result is an emphasis on -
or a rebalancing toward - subjective knowledge and the recognition, echoing Nonaka,
that ultimately "knowledge is context-specific and relational.P?? Hence, the concept
of tacit knowledge becomes the way to link knowledge with action.
If knowledge is understood as a framework for evaluating and incorporating new
information, then action is in tum understood as "a choice that is made on the basis
of knowledge." 291This choice is conceived of as a decision which is made on the basis
of evaluating the (knowledge of) the consequences of each option. All of this is
assumed to take place inside the head of an individual agent,292Hence, knowledge
and action are linked, but linked inside the mind of the individual agent/actor. From
288 The substantial changes to the role of knowledge in society eventually impacts on the
relation between that which is known and the subject that knows it. The transformation of
this relationship as the commodification of knowledge is described by Lyotard. See,
Lyotard, JF. 1984. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Manchester: Manchester
University Press: 4-5.
289 Schreinemakers and Essers. Nonaka's Subjectivist Conception of Knowledge in Corporate
Knowledge Management: 26.
290 Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 59.
291Stacey. Complex Responsive Processes in Organization: 17.
292 Stacey. Complex Responsive Processes in Organization: 17.
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there Nonaka's recognition that "knowledge is essentially related to human action"293
and that ultimately it is individuals who act.
Tum this insight around and a knowledge perspective becomes a management tool.
Whereas human resource management normally focussed on human behaviour, the
concept of tacit knowledge becomes a way to explain (and possibly manage)
behaviour via cognitionr» On the one level this shift in emphasis can be seen as a
knowledge management reinterpretation of human resource management. The
concept of tacit knowledge then simply serves as a way of arguing that people matter
to the organisation, even in the face of radical technological advances. The tacit
knowledge bases of the individual employees - encompassing tacit knowledge
content as well as tacit skills - collectively embody the human resources of the
organisation.
On another level, it makes it possible to root knowledge in practices and thus provide
a non-hermeneutic explanation for human behaviour. Defining knowledge in terms
of action is the closest that knowledge management theory comes to Polanyi's
conceptualisation of tacit knowing as an act of integration. Essentially it involves
grounding cognition and knowledge in human practices. Taking the example of
Polanyi's argument concerning scientific knowledge as reliant on a whole host of
background practices. These practices are not open to direct scrutiny, because they
are a mixture of skills and presuppositions, and the structure of skill is such that it
breaks down as soon as it is reduced to its constituent parts during analysis. Thus
grounding all knowledge in practices, Polanyi 'solves' the epistemological problem.
In a similar way, the concept of tacit knowledge functions as a feigned
epistemological answer in knowledge management theory. Referring back to the
epistemological gap that faced knowledge management theory at a particular point,
293Nonaka and Takeuchi. The Knowledge-Creating Company: 59.
294Kinghorn argues (with reference to Sensemaking theory) that there has been a shift in the
focus of management thinking from behaviour to cognition. See, Kinghorn, J. 2002.
Understanding Organizational Sense Making: A Diagnostic Tool for Strategic Leadership
inConditions of Complexity, in Leibold, M, GJS Probst, and M Gibbert (eds.), Strategic
Management in the Knowledge Economy. London: Wiley: 322.
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the concept of tacit knowledge makes it possible to talk about knowledge in terms of
practices. This deferment of the epistemological problem away from questions of
knowledge to questions of practice, means that cognition is often thought of in terms
of behaviour. It appears as if in some instances the concept of tacit knowledge
functions as epistemological prevarication - in other words it is a means to escape the
epistemological problem faced by knowledge management theory.
Escaping the epistemological problem in this way might have been feasible, provided
that the concept of tacit knowledge is used strictly in the way that Polanyi
conceptualised it. But, as soon as it is used to signify knowledge content that cannot
be communicated as information (as it has been shown is the case post-Non aka
knowledge management theory), the concept of tacit knowledge becomes shorthand
for knowledge content, rather than the integrative skills that is the structure
underlying knowledge. This has the unfortunate consequence of putting all the
epistemological questions back on the table. Then all the questions about the extent
and reliability of explicit knowledge content, also holds for the tacit knowledge
content. It seems then as if the concept of tacit knowledge - at least in the way it is
currently being employed - fails to properly bridge the epistemological gap. The
concluding section will argue that this epistemological gap facing knowledge
management theory cannot be bridged without a shift in ontology.
1.5 ONTOLOGY IN REVIEW
Although Nonaka's SECI-model and the distinction between tacit and explicit
knowledge enjoyed the status of the almost default epistemology in knowledge
management theory for a period, the epistemological shortcoming outlined above
caused it to be increasingly challenged by other approaches to the phenomenon of
organisational knowledge. In last few years there has been an increasing interest in
alternative theoretical resources. Stacey links this interest in alternative theories with
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the most basic assumptions of mainstream knowledge management theory -
signalling an ontological rather than epistemological discomfort.s"
Thinkers who were uncomfortable with the representational character of the
epistemology of the information paradigm, turned to auiopoiesis theory as the basis of
epistemology.ë" The notion of mental models is a good example of representational
thinking in that it assumes that a representation of the external reality is somehow
stored in the brains of the individual agents as a mental model. Von Krogh, Roos and
Slocum argue against this view, rather opting for an auiopoieiic view of the brain that
suggests that "the world is not a pre-given state to be represented, but rather that
cognition is a creative act of bringing forth a world."297In opposition to the orthodox
view, autopoiesis holds that reality is constantly and actively created (or enacted). One
of the important implications that this change in ontology has for the epistemology of
knowledge management theory is that information has now to be thought of in terms
of self-referentiality. Turning data into information is now dependent on a process of
interpretation. In other words, information can no longer be seen as person-
independent or objective and therefore can no longer be treated as a substance that
can be packaged as a message and communicated between a sender and a receiver.ë"
A second assumption that is the cause of theoretical dissent is the idea, derived from
Nonaka, that the source of new knowledge is in the mind (tacit realm) of the
individual.e? In response to this writers looked towards the theory of organisational
sense-making, as it emphasises the socially constructed (enacted) nature of reality.ë" 301
Stacey argues that sense-making challenges the mainstream knowledge management
theory assumption that there is a clear distinction between tacit and explicit
295Stacey. Complex Responsive Processes in Organization: 29,33-38.
2% Stacey. Complex Responsive Processes in Organization: 30.
297Von Krogh, Roos, and Slocum. An Essay on Corporate Epistemology, (eds.): 58.
298Von Krogh, Roos, and Slocum. An Essay on Corporate Epistemology, (eds.): 59.
299 Stacey. Complex Responsive Processes in Organization: 30-31.
300 Weick, K. 1995. Sensemaking in Organisations. London: Sage
301 Kinghorn provides an overview of the increasing popularity of organisational
sensemaking. See, Kinghorn. Understanding Organizational Sense Making: A Diagnostic
Tool for Strategic Leadership inConditions of Complexity.
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knowledge and that explicit knowledge has priority.ê" This is because sense-making
holds that people enact reality as they interact with one another.
But in Stacey's assessment, both autopoiesis and sense-making theory still implicitly
assume the split between the individual and social levels of analysis and the causal
framework that underlies the information processing paradigm.w In other words,
the ontological shift is incomplete and as a consequence both autopoiesis and sense-
making are still subject to the limitations that the split between subject/object place on
thinking about knowledge creation in organisations.w' What is needed in order to
theorise organisational knowledge creation is an ontology that avoids the split
between the individual and social levels and that incorporates a notion of causality
that can accommodate self-organisation. Stacey proposes Complex Adaptive Systems
theory as the basis of an ontology that can conceptualise the "evolution of knowledge
as participative self-organisation."305
Exactly how complexity theory helps to understand organisational knowledge
creation is not at issue. What is, however, of interest is the fact that a number of
authors in knowledge management theory are looking towards complexity theory to
provide insight into the problem of knowledge creation. Some commentators are of
the opinion that knowledge management theory is moving into a next generation -
one that is no longer dominated by Nonaka's epistemology.ê= Snowden writes:
302 Stacey. Complex Responsive Processes in Organization: 37.
303 Stacey. Complex Responsive Processes in Organization: 38-39.
304 Stacey. Complex Responsive Processes in Organization: 39.
305 Stacey. Complex Responsive Processes in Organization: 218.
306 Firestone, JM and MW McElroy. 2003. The New Knowledge Management; Snowden.
Complex Acts of Knowing; Tuomi, I.2002. The Future of Knowledge Management,
Lifelong Learning in Europe VII/ 2.
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We are reaching the end of the second generation of knowledge
management, with its focus on tacit-explicit knowledge conversion.
Triggered by the SECI-model of Nonaka, it replaced a first generation
focus on timely information provision ....The third generation requires
the clear separation of context, narrative and content management
and challenges the orthodoxy of scientific management.s"
This challenge to the orthodoxy of scientific management is an ontological one, as
Snowden draws on complex adaptive systems theory to build a model for managing
contexts and identifies "the natural flow of knowledge creation."30B
It is thus possible to identify a definite movement away from the concept of tacit
knowledge and the ontology of the information processing view of organisations that
appropriated the concept. In recent years increasing numbers of knowledge
management theorists have been looking at frameworks with radical ontologies -
such as autopoiesis, sense-making and complexity theory - specifically to address the
issue of knowledge creation.P?
To conclude: the way in which the concept of tacit knowledge has been appropriated
into post-Nonaka knowledge management theory, by merely deferring the problem
of knowledge creation to the level of the individual, did not address this fundamental
issue. It therefore seems that knowledge management theory that aims to address
knowledge creation, rather than knowledge processing, has to look further than the
concept of tacit knowledge. The recent trend in the direction of complexity theory
suggests that the epistemological challenge facing such a knowledge management
theory can only really be addressed if the ontological dimension is also taken into
account.
307 Snowden. Complex Acts of Knowing: 1.
308 Snowden. Complex Acts of Knowing: 12.
309 Snowden. Complex Acts of Knowing; Von Krogh, Roos, and Slocum. An Essay on
Corporate Epistemology, (eds.); Weick. Sensemaking in Organisations.
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